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I.

I NTRODUCTION

By some estimates, the Clean Air Act 1 (CAA) has provided
$22 trillion in health savings and benefits to the general public. 2
Tom Skelton is a third year law student at The John Marshall Law
School. His interests include environmental and international law. He wishes
to thank his family, professors, and the John Marshall Law Review editorial
staff for their support with the comment.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2016).
2. Alan H. Lockwood, How the Clean Air Act Has Saved $22 Trillion in
*
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However, in Michigan v. EPA, 3 the Supreme Court struck down
hazardous air pollution (HAP) regulations in the CAA because the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) failed to consider
costs early enough in the rule making process. 4 These regulations
had been held up in legal challenges and bureaucratic politics for
over 20 years. 5 Given the enormous benefit of fully implementing
the CAA, why did the Court limit the EPA’s ability to enforce the
law?
No matter its rationale, the Court’s holding has led to diverse
reactions
across
the
legal
and
political
community. 6
Environmentalists have downplayed the significance of the Court’s
holding, while conservatives interpreted the decision as lending
evidence to support their rejection of President Obama’s
environmental agenda. 7 Meanwhile, industry experts have
Health-Care
Costs,
THE
ATLANTIC (Sept. 26, 2015, 2:37 PM),
www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/09/how-the-clean-air-act-has-saved22-trillion-in-health-care-costs/262071/; see also U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT FROM 1990 TO 2020 (2011),
www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-07/documents/fullreport_rev_a.pdf.
The overall net benefit estimate ranged from $1 trillion to $35 trillion dollars.
Id. Total costs of compliance for the Act was $65 billion. Id. The EPA described
the steps taken in its analysis as: “1. air pollutant emissions modeling; 2.
compliance cost estimation; 3. ambient air quality modeling; 4. health and
environmental effects estimation; 5. economic valuation of these effects; and,
6. results aggregation and uncertainty characterization.” Id.
3. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015).
4. Id. at 2708.
5. See New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574, 579–80 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(describing the history of HAP regulation of coal and oil power plants); CRAIG
COLLINS, TOXIC LOOPHOLES, 46–47 (2010) (detailing changes to the HAP
regulations under George W. Bush’s Clear Skies Initiative); see also Michigan
v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2705–06 (explaining regulatory and legal actions taken
between 1998 and 2014 regarding HAP regulations).
6. See Jonathan H. Adler, Supreme Court Smacks EPA for Ignoring Costs,
but Mercury Rule Likely to Persevere, WASH. POST (June 30, 2015),
www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/06/30/supreme-cou
rt-smacks-epa-for-ignoring-costs-but-mercury-rule-likely-to-persevere
(questioning precedential value of decision); see also Rebecca Leber, Antonin
Scalia Compared a Lifesaving EPA Regulation to a Ferrari, THE NEW
REPUBLIC (June 29, 2015), www.newrepublic.com/article/122198/antoninscalia-compared-lifesaving-epa-regulation-ferrari (criticizing the decision and
featuring a humorous picture of Justice Scalia driving a Ferrari in response to
Justice Scalia’s analogy in the case).
7. See Mindy Goldstein, Michigan v. EPA: Does It Mean More Than
L.
(July
10,
2015),
http://law.emory.edu/newsMercury?,
EMORY
center/releases/2015/07/Michigan-v-EPA-does-it-mean-more-than-mercury.ht
ml (questioning the significance of the Michigan holding); Sanjay Narayan,
Michigan v. EPA: Are Mercury Protections Worthwhile? We Know the Answer,
SIERRA CLUB (June 30, 2015), www.sierraclub.org/planet/2015/06/michigan-vepa-are-mercury-protections-worthwhile-we-know-answer (pointing out the
narrowness of the holding, while also criticizing the notion that the EPA
should have to consider costs in regulations); Michigan v. EPA: Cost and
Benefits Matter, SENATE REPUBLICAN POL’Y COMMITTEE (July 9, 2015),
www.rpc.senate.gov/policy-papers/michigan-v-epa-costs-and-benefits-matter
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reported that most power plants instituted measures to meet these
regulations even as they were challenged by industry groups in the
courts. 8
From a legal perspective, Michigan v EPA is the latest
addition to an evolving body of case law interpreting the CAA. 9
The Supreme Court has addressed cost-benefit issue when
interpreting environmental statutes and regulations no fewer than
three times over the past four decades. 10 However, in Michigan v.
EPA, the Court made a questionable break from a longstanding
principle giving deference to a federal agency’s reasonable
interpretation of ambiguous statutory language. 11 This break
(presenting Michigan v. EPA holding as evidence to reject President Obama’s
environmental agenda); see also Andrew M. Grossman, Does EPA’s Supreme
Court Loss Doom Obama’s Climate Agenda?, CATO INST. (June 29, 2015, 1:04
PM),
www.cato.org/blog/does-epas-supreme-court-loss-doom-obamas-climateagenda (declaring Obama environmental plans illegal); Sam Hananel, Appeals
Court Leaves EPA Mercury Pollution Rule in Effect, ABC NEWS (Dec. 15, 2015,
12:43 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory/appeals-court-leaves-epamercury-rule-effect-35774185 (reporting that Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit ruled that the HAPs rule remain in effect while the EPA
recalculates costs and benefits).
8. Eric Wolff, Supreme Court’s Eventual MATS Ruling Will Be (Mostly)
Moot, SNL FIN. (May 14, 2015, 8:30 AM), www.snl.com/InteractiveX/
Article.aspx?cdid=A-32620730-13109; see also Brief of Emission Control
Companies as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents and in Support of
Affirmance at 19–20, Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015) (No. 14-46)
(asserting that of the 271 Gigawatts (GW) of coal-fired power generation in the
U.S. 36% will not bear direct costs for mercury compliance, 24% have already
complied with the rules through state regulations or consent decrees, and the
remaining 40% are in the process of complying); Mark Drajem, Obama May
Win by Losing in Quirk of Supreme Court EPA Review, BLOOMBERG (June 24,
2015, 5:13 PM), www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-24/obama-maywin-by-losing-in-quirk-of-supreme-court-epa-review (speculating that most
coal plants retired because of HAP regulations will remain retired).
9. See, e.g., Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2437 (2014)
(addressing whether CAA regulation of car greenhouse gas emissions
triggered CAA permitting requirements); EPA v. EME Homer City
Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1599 (2014) (upholding the EPA’s
interpretation of the “Good Neighbor Provisions” in the CAA); see also
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 462–63 (2001) (addressing
whether the EPA had to consider costs when revising National Ambient Air
Quality Standards (NAAQS)); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) (affirming the EPA’s plant-wide definition of
CAA term “stationary source”).
10. See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2709–10 (addressing cost
considerations in HAP regulation for coal and oil power plants); EME Homer
City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct at 1610 (holding that Good Neighbor Provision
does not require the EPA to disregard implementation costs); see also
Whitman, 531 U.S. at 486 (finding that the EPA cannot consider
implementation costs in setting NAAQS); Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S.
246, 256 (1976) (holding that the EPA cannot consider economic feasibility in
reviewing State Implementation Plans (SIP) for NAAQS).
11. See, e.g., Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–44 (1984) (laying down the Supreme
Court’s accepted framework for addressing statutory construction questions);
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could have significant implications for President Obama’s Clean
Power Plan. 12
This comment first gives an overview of the CAA and the
Clear Air Act Amendments of 1990 13 (1990 CAA Amendments). It
discusses both the structure of the CAA, and the legislative history
of the 1990 CAA Amendments including some of the law’s policy
and political goals. Turning to the judicial interpretation of the
CAA, this comment will present a legal history of the particular
section of the CAA at issue in Michigan v. EPA. 14
The Analysis section critiques the Supreme Court’s decision
in Michigan v. EPA. The decision misapprehended statutory
context and misapplied relevant case law. Additionally, the Court
utilized a novel application of the Chenery doctrine, an important
administrative law principle named after the landmark 1943 case
SEC v. Chenery Corp. 15 concerning how government agencies
justify their actions, in order to exclude a cost-benefit analysis
from judicial review. 16 The Analysis section will also discuss the
possible impacts of the Michigan v. EPA decision on the Clean
Power Plan.
The Proposal section proposes litigation goals that Clean
Power Plan defenders should pursue in light of the Michigan v.
EPA decision. First, Clean Power Plan defenders must invest in
the major questions argument. 17 Second, defenders of the Clean
Power Plan need to focus on existing energy market conditions.
Third, Clean Power Plan defenders need to define and explain
benefits and co-benefits of the Clean Power Plan thoroughly to the
King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2014) (affirming Chevron two step
framework); see also FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120,
132 (2000) (holding same).
12. See, e.g., Eric Groten, Here Be Dragons: Legal Threats to EPA’s
Proposed Existing Source Performance Standards for Electric Generating
Units, 45 ENVTL. L. REP. 10116, 10117 (2015) (examining generally the
statutory problems with the Clean Power Plan existing immediately before the
Michigan v. EPA decision); see also Ann E. Carlson & Megan M. Herzog,
Symposium: Text in Context: The Fate of Emergency Climate Regulation after
UARG and EME Homer, 39 HARV . ENVTL. L. REV . 23, 24 (2015) (suggesting
the Court will decide the Clean Power Plan’s fate according to either a UARG
or EME Homer City framework).
13. Clean Act Air Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–549, 104 Stat.
2399 (1990).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n) (2016); Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2705.
15. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943)
16. See id. at 87 (1943) (stating, “The grounds upon which an
administrative order must be judged are those upon which the record discloses
that its action was based.”); see also Michigan v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. at 2710
(applying Chenery doctrine).
17. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S at 159-60 (holding
that Congress does not delegate to federal agencies the power to settle major
political or economic questions); Kevin O. Leske, Major Questions About the
“Major Questions” Doctrine, 5 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 479, 484-485
(2016) (describing the major questions doctrine).
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Court. The Michigan v. EPA decision shows that a fraction of the
Court is skeptical of the EPA’s attempts to use existing provisions
in the CAA to address climate change concerns. If advocates for
the Clean Power Plan focus on the concerns raised in Michigan v.
EPA, they may be able to defend the Clean Power Plan
successfully.

II. BACKGROUND: A HISTORY OF THE CAA AND THE
STATUTE AT I SSUE IN MICHIGAN V. EPA
Throughout the history of the CAA, the law has adjusted to
regulatory challenges and demands by the public for stricter
pollution controls. 18 Since the CAA was first enacted in 1970,
Congress has substantially amended the law on two occasions. 19
To develop an informed understanding of the CAA as it stands
today, it is first necessary to understand the historical difficulties
in implementing effective pollution controls faced by Congress and
the President.

A. Structure and Policy of the Clean Air Act 1970–1990
The 1970 CAA emerged from a variety of federal policies and
laws designed to control air pollution. 20 The federal government
tried to incentivize states to create air pollution control measures
through grants during the 1950s and 1960s. 21 In 1967, Congress
passed the Air Quality Act 22 which required states to establish air
quality standards for metropolitan regions or else face federally
mandated standards. 23 However, this legislation was ultimately
unsuccessful. 24 By 1970, no state had established air quality
standards, and in response Congress created the original CAA. 25

18. See G ARY C. BRYNER, BLUE SKIES, G REEN POLITICS: THE CLEAN AIR
ACT OF 1990, 81–115 (1993) (considering environmental problems that lead to
reform of the CAA); see also The Honorable Henry A. Waxman, Overview and
Critique: An Overview of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 21 ENVTL. L.
1721, 1733–43 (1991) (focusing specifically on the problems leading to the
1990 CAA Amendments).
19. See BRYNER, supra note 18, at 79–100 (exploring changes to the CAA).
20. BRYNER, supra note 18, at 81.
21. Id.
22. Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485 (1967).
23. BRYNER, supra note 18, at 81. The Air Quality Act also contained
provisions to increase research in air pollution prevention and assist states in
developing air pollution control plans. See ROY S. BELDEN, CLEAN AIR ACT, 6
(2d ed. 2011) (listing Air Quality Act provisions).
24. BRYNER, supra note 18, at 81.
25. See id. (discussing Air Quality Act); see also BELDEN, supra note 23, at
6 (analyzing the advantages and drawbacks of The Air Quality Act of 1967).
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The 1970 CAA included a variety of measures to address air
pollution from stationary and moving sources. 26 Two major
provisions of the CAA mandated national ambient air quality
standards
(NAAQS)
on category pollutants for specific
geographical regions and for new stationary pollution sources. 27
The CAA allowed states to develop state implementation plans
(SIP) to meet these air quality standards. 28 Congress also
mandated emissions standards based on the best available
emissions controls for each specific industry. 29 Additionally, the
CAA gave the EPA discretion to regulate HAPs based on the
Agency’s understanding of public health risks. 30 The CAA
established causes of action for the EPA or private citizens to
challenge dangerous polluters in court as well. 31
The 1970 CAA contained many provisions governing “moving
sources of pollution,” a term which primarily referred to cars and
automobile emissions. 32 Specifically, the EPA required the auto
industry to reduce emissions of carbon monoxide, hydrocarbons,
and nitrogen oxide by 90% for new vehicle models. 33 Additionally,
cars had to maintain their emissions levels for 5 years or 50,000
miles. 34 The government levied a $10,000 fine for removing vehicle
emission control devices. 35
Many of the more ambitious programs in the 1970 CAA
proved to be difficult to implement in practice, resulting in the
1977 CAA Amendments. 36 In 1977, the auto industry threatened
to shut down production of 1978 model cars because they faced a
penalty of $10,000 for each non-compliant car. 37 Additionally
many areas in the country fail to meet the 1970 CAA’s NAAQS
provisions. 38 In response to these challenges, the 1977 CAA
Amendments largely extended the deadlines for NAAQS and
vehicle emissions compliance. 39

26. See BELDEN, supra note 23, at 6–7 (discussing the 1970 CAA).
27. Id.
28. BRYNER, supra note 18, at 83.
29. BELDEN, supra note 23, at 7.
30. See id. (discussing HAP regulations); see also BRYNER, supra note 18,
at 125–26 (mentioning early HAP regulations in the CAA).
31. BRYNER, supra note 18, at 84.
32. Id. at 83–84.
33. See id. at 83 (detailing air quality regulations for vehicles). For
nitrogen oxides this reduction was from 1971 model years, while for carbon
monoxide and hydrocarbons it was from 1970 model years. Id.
34. Id. at 84.
35. Id.
36. BELDEN, supra note 23, at 7 (describing the lack of progress in
achieving the goals of the 1970 CAA). Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977,
Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977).
37. BRYNER, supra note 18, at 85.
38. BELDEN, supra note 23, at 7.
39. BRYNER, supra note 18, at 85.
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During the 1980s, President Ronald Reagan changed how
government agencies create regulations, which resulted in delayed
implementation
of
many
CAA
provisions. 40 Government
regulations had to meet cost-benefit analyses, and the President
established an appeals process through the Task Force on
Regulatory Relief to resolve interagency conflicts. 41 This intricate
appeals process resulted in regulatory morass and a failure to
address many pressing environmental problems through rule
making and enforcement. 42 In 1983, for example, the EPA
introduced rules to curb acid rain. 43 Member of Reagan’s
administration ridiculed the program as overly expensive. 44
Because of the complicated regulatory oversight structure, the
rules went nowhere. 45
Congressional frustration with inaction at the EPA sparked
unsuccessful efforts to amend the CAA throughout the 1980s. 46
During the decade, the House considered various measures which
would become part of the 1990 CAA Amendments. 47 Ultimately,
the measures failed either in committee, or before a floor vote. 48 In
the Senate in 1988, George Mitchell managed to pass a bill similar
to the 1990 CAA Amendments out of the Environment and Public
Works Committee. 49 The measure died before a floor vote during
contentious negotiations between the United Mine Workers and
environmentalists. 50 While the 1980s saw stymied efforts at
environmental legislation, various measures were percolating in
Congress to address major environmental problems in the
nation. 51

40. Id. at 86–91, 173-74. See also id. at 176 (describing stalled rulemaking
for a 25 percent recycling goal in December 1990 even though President
George H.W. Bush supported the goal in the 1988 presidential campaign).
41. See O FFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON
THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS (1997), www.whitehouse.
gov/omb/inforeg_chap1 (examining changes in the Executive Office under
President Reagan). The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) could
effectively stall rulemaking if it found proposed regulations incompatible with
administration goals. BRYNER, supra note 18, at 173.
42. Id. at 29–32, 174-76.
43. Id. at 117.
44. Id. (detailing story where the new EPA administrator William
Ruckelshaus tried to develop acid rain regulations only to be ridiculed by OMB
Director David Stockman).
45. Id.
46. Waxman, supra note 18, at 1723–34.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1728–29 (analyzing acid rain and hazardous air pollutants
controls introduced in the House).
49. BRYNER, supra note 18, at 92.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 91–93 (explaining congressional gridlock in the late 1980s).
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B. The 1990 CAA Amendments
After the 1988 presidential elections, many important leaders
in Washington, including President George H.W. Bush and
Senator George Mitchell, wanted to amend the CAA. 52 Congress
unsuccessfully tried to reform the struggling law for much of the
previous decade, while strong environmental challenges faced the
nation. 53 Together, these forces combined to spark comprehensive
changes in the way the nation handled air pollution. 54
Motivation for some of the 1990 CAA Amendments came from
increasingly difficult environmental problems in the United States
and abroad. 55 Polluters were required to report their emissions
levels starting in the late 1980s. 56 The results disturbed the
general public, as it showed many businesses released substantial
amounts of chemicals that cause acid rain and ozone depletion. 57
Public consciousness of ozone depletion rose throughout the 1980s,
culminating in the Montreal Protocol, an international agreement
regulating emissions of ozone depleting chemicals. 58 Around the
same time, two man-made disasters — the Bhopal chemical
explosion and the Exxon Valdez ship wreck — increased public
awareness of chemical hazards. 59 By the start of the 1988
Congressional term, the public was ready for Congress to pass
major environmental legislation. 60

52. See id. at 94. (describing election of CAA supporter President George
H.W. Bush and Senator George Mitchell).
53. Waxman, supra note 18, at 1723–34 (noting especially the effect of the
Bhopal accident).
54. See BRYNER, supra note 18, at 165–84 (considering the significance of
the 1990 CAA Amendments).
55. See id. at 62 (discussing Superfund legislation).
56. Id.
57. Id. (showing that businesses released about 2.7 billion pounds of
pollutants leading to between 300 and 1500 annual cancer fatalities).
58. Id. at 74.
59. See Waxman, supra note 18, at 1729 (detailing the Bhopal accident).
The Bhopal accident occurred when a storage tank at an industrial facility in
Bhopal, India released 60,000 pounds of methyl isocyanate killing over 2,500
people and leaving 100,000 with permanent disabilities. Id. The accident
“resulted from operating errors, design flaws, maintenance failures, training
deficiencies and economy measures that endangered safety.” Stuart Diamond,
The Bhopal Disaster: How It Happened, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1985,
www.nytimes.com/1985/01/28/world/the-bhopal-disaster-how-it-happened.html
?pagewanted=all. A few years later, the Exxon Valdez oil tanker spilled over
270,000 barrels of oil into Prince William Sound, Alaska after it ran aground.
See Philip Sahecoff, Largest U.S. Tanker Spill Spews 270,000 Barrels of Oil
Off Alaska, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1988, www.nytimes.com/learn
ing/general/onthisday/big/0324.html (describing the effects of the Exxon
Valdez oil spill); see also Waxman, supra note 18, at 1729, 1735 (discussing the
Exxon Valdez oil spill).
60. See BRYNER, supra note 18, at 92–94 (describing events leading to the
CAA).
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Along with these environmental challenges, two important
political changes sparked the effort to reform the CAA. 61 First, in
the 1988 presidential campaign, Republican presidential candidate
George H.W. Bush needed to distance himself from the then
unpopular Republican President Reagan. 62 Bush focused on
reforming the CAA as a way to present himself as a different kind
of Republican. 63 Once Bush was president, he sought to make good
on his reform promise, and so he introduced a bill to reform the
CAA. 64 While Congress did not ultimately adopt the legislation,
the bill added credibility to the issue and established a benchmark
in negotiations between Republicans and Democrats. 65
Second, a change in Senate leadership removed a barrier to
the 1990 CAA Amendments. 66 In 1998, George Mitchell replaced
Robert Byrd as majority leader in the Senate. 67 Byrd was a major
barrier to passing environmental legislation in the past. 68 He
represented West Virginia, a state with a large coal mining
industry, and wanted to protect jobs in his state. 69 Senator
Mitchell, on the other hand, was a strong environmentalist who
previously worked on CAA reforms. 70
The 1990 CAA Amendments were the product of intense
negotiations and compromise in Congress. 71 First, Congressmen
John Dingell and Henry Waxman came together on a framework
to pass CAA legislation out of the House. 72 This was an important
61. See id. at 93–110 (recounting the 1988 Presidential election and the
resignation of Robert Byrd from Senate Democratic leadership).
62. Id. at 94.
63. Id. See also Videotape: The Clean Air Act of 1990 Featuring Robert
Grady, Roger Porter, and Alan K. Simpson, C-SPAN (Apr. 4, 2014), www.cspan.org/video/?318654-3/clean-air-act-1990 [hereinafter Videotape discussion]
(featuring discussion of George H.W. Bush campaign speech on environmental
issues in Boston, Massachusetts).
64. BRYNER, supra note 18, at 94–97.
65. Id. at 97–100 (listing several points in the legislative process where
President Bush threatened a veto of legislation that went over the total costs
of his bill); see also Waxman, supra note 18, at 1736–39 (discussing veto
threats).
66. See BRYNER, supra note 18, at 94 (detailing George Mitchell’s assent to
Senate leadership).
67. Id.
68. Id.; Waxman, supra note 18, at 1727.
69. BRYNER, supra note 18, at 105.
70. Id. at 80 (Senator Mitchell had a long standing commitment to the
legislation, dating from his service as chairman of the Senate Committee on
Environment and Public Work’s Subcommittee on Environmental Protection
in 1987–1988).
71. See id. 91–115 (explaining the compromises that lead to the 1990 CAA).
72. Waxman, supra note 18, at 1737 (including a story of detailed
negotiations between Waxman and Chairman John Dingell (D-Mich.) that
became the framework for 1990 CAA Amendments). Congressman Dingell
represented a district near Detroit, Michigan. Id. In the past, he was a barrier
to passing CAA reform because he was resistant to new controls on auto
emissions and felt the auto industry had done enough to protect the
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step since many thought the House would have been less likely to
pass legislation than the Senate. 73 In the Senate, George Mitchell
arranged months of late night negotiations in his office involving
the President’s staff and Senate Republicans to come up with a
bill. 74 After reaching an agreement on a bill, Senator Mitchell
warded off an attempt by Senator Byrd to defeat political support
for the bill. 75 Senator Byrd introduced an amendment to include
bloated unemployment benefits for coal miners laid off because of
the bill. 76 This amendment was likely to destroy political support
for the bill, but the Senate voted it down by one vote. 77 The Senate
then passed its own CAA legislation. 78 The two bills were different
in many ways, and therefore were subjected to a conference
committee that produced the final version of the 1990 CAA
Amendments. 79
What emerged from the conference committee was a series of
changes to the CAA designed to meet complex new environmental
The 1990
CAA
Amendments
added
new
challenges. 80
classifications to the NAAQS along with stricter deadlines for
emissions reductions and broader stationary source coverage. 81
They also required reductions in hydrocarbon and nitrogen oxide
emissions from cars by 35% and 60%, respectively. 82 New cars
were required to maintain these emissions standards for 10 years
or 100,000 miles. 83 Additionally, the legislation established a cap
and trade program for sulfur dioxide emissions and implemented
ozone protection controls among other measures. 84
environment. See BRYNER, supra note 18, at 80 (detailing Congressman’s
Dingell’s control of the Energy and Commerce Committee).
73. Waxman, supra note 18, at 1737 (recounting predictions of a combative
and drawn out negotiation processes that did not come to fruition).
74. BRYNER, supra note 18, at 101–03; see also Videotape discussion, supra
note 63 (including a discussion of negotiations between Republicans and
Senate Democrats).
75. BRYNER, supra note 18, at 105–06.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Waxman, supra note 18, at 1739 (detailing the conference committee
process); BRYNER, supra note 18, at 109–15.
80. See BRYNER, supra note 18, at 123–27 (providing an overview of 1990
CAA Amendments).
81. BELDEN, supra note 23, at 8 (explaining the process in the legislation
for incrementally increasing attainment for NAAQS provisions).
82. BRYNER, supra note 18, at 125.
83. Id.
84. BRYNER, supra note 18, at 124. The acid rain control provisions first
reduced sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions then established
emissions allowances that conform to the cap. Id. In terms of ozone protection,
the law included a program similar to the Montreal Protocol except with an
accelerated schedule. Id. BELDEN, supra note 23, at 8–9. The law also
increased penalties for violators and expanded citizen lawsuit provisions.
BRYNER, supra note 18, at 124.
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In regards to HAPs, the EPA had formerly been reluctant to
regulate HAPs according to public health standards, primarily for
cost reasons. 85 Between 1970 and 1990, the EPA codified only
seven HAP regulations in total. 86 The new law listed 189 HAPs
and required the EPA to promulgate Maximum Achievable
Control Technology (MACT) standards mandating polluters install
equipment to curb emissions. 87 Congress required the EPA to
conduct a risk assessments to determine if more emissions
reductions were necessary to ensure an “ample margin of safety”
for HAP emissions. 88 The specific subsection of the CAA at issue in
Michigan v. EPA — 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n) — was part of the Title III
HAP reduction legislation. 89

C. A Legal History of HAP Regulations for Coal and Oil
Power Plants at Issue in Michigan v. EPA
There is a unique legislative history to 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)
that emerged out of the conference committee for the 1990 CAA
Amendments. The statute’s plan text requires the EPA to study
the adverse health effects from HAP emissions for coal and oil
power plants. 90 Then, the statue provides that: “[t]he
Administrator shall regulate electric utility steam generating
units [coal and oil power plants] under this section, if the
Administrator finds such regulation is appropriate and necessary
after considering the results of the study.” 91
As the official legislative history of the 1990 CAA
Amendments shows, there was some uncertainty concerning the
application of HAP emission reductions to coal and oil power
plants. 92 For six substances, the EPA found that regulating coal
and oil power plants would not result in any public health benefit,
but for others the Agency was less certain. 93 The Senate passed a
version of the law without any separate HAP regulation for coal
and oil power plants, while the House version included the
language present in § 7412(n). 94 The conference committee
85. BRYNER, supra note 18, at 117.
86. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, THE CLEAN AIR ACT IN A NUTSHELL: HOW
IT WORKS (2013), www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-05/documents/
caa_nutshell.pdf.
87. 42 U.S.C. § 112(d) (2016); BRYNER, supra note 18, at 125–26.
88. BRYNER, supra note 18, at 124.
89. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2705.
90. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A) (2016).
91. Id.
92. Congressional Research Service, A Legislative History of the Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1990, 1414–16 (1993), http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/
pt?id=uc1.$b561714;view=1up;seq=1436 [hereinafter Legislative History].
93. Id. at 1416. The substances were arsenic, beryllium, cadmium,
hexavalent chromium, formaldehyde, and radionuclides. Id.
94. White Stallion Energy Ctr., LLC v. EPA, 748 F.3d 1222, 1264

1268

The John Marshall Law Review

[49:1257

adopted the House’s language to compensate for the uncertainty
involved in regulating HAPs from coal and oil power plants. 95
Thus, the EPA could regulate “only if warranted by the scientific
evidence.” 96 This ensured that the EPA would not issue duplicative
regulations on coal and oil power plants. 97
In 1998, the EPA found that it was necessary and appropriate
to regulate HAP emissions from coal and oil power plants. 98
However, President George W. Bush reversed this finding in 2003
as part of his Clear Skies Initiative. 99 The plan removed coal and
oil power plants from the list of HAP regulated sources and
implemented a cap-and-trade scheme for Mercury emissions
instead. 100 However, in New Jersey v. EPA, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ordered the
EPA to issue HAP regulations despite to the Clean Skies
Initiative. 101 That court held that the EPA failed to follow the
statutory procedure for de-listing a source of pollution. 102
The EPA in 2012 restarted the rule making process for
regulating HAPs from coal and oil power plants. 103 The Agency
found that the regulations were appropriate because of risks to
public health and the environment and necessary because the
CAA’s other provisions did not eliminate the risks. 104 Additionally,
the EPA argued that “costs should not be considered when
deciding whether power plants should be regulated.” 105 The Court
in Michigan v. EPA reviewed the EPA’s rationale for regulating
HAPs from fossil fuel fired power plants. 106

D. The Court’s Reasoning in Michigan v. EPA
The Court utilized statutory context and previous case law to
support its conclusion that the EPA’s statutory construction was
(Kavanaugh, J. dissenting) (D.C. Cir. 2014).
95. Legislative History, supra note 92, at 1416.
96. Id. (“Under the conference agreement adopting the approach that the
House included in its bill, these and other scientific issues will be examined,
and regulations will be imposed only if warranted by the scientific evidence”).
97. Id.
98. New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d at 579 (recalling the results of the HAP
study including the dangers from methylmercury in fish).
99. COLLINS, supra note 5, at 46–47.
100. New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d at 579–80. Some suggest that the Clear
Skies Initiative was meant to placate the utility lobby which donated $4
million to President George W. Bush’s first election campaign. See COLLINS,
supra note 5, at 45 (suggesting a possible link between President Bush’s
environmental policy and his campaign contributors).
101. New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d at 583.
102. Id.
103. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2705.
104. Id.
105. Id. (quotations omitted).
106. Id.
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unreasonable. 107 Other parts of § 7412(n) direct the EPA to
conduct a study that considers costs of available technology to
reduce mercury emissions from other sources. 108 According to the
Court, since the statute directs the EPA to consider costs in that
study, the EPA should also consider costs in its decision to
regulate coal and oil power plants. 109 The EPA cited Whitman v.
American Trucking Ass’ns 110 in support of its reading of §
7412(n). 111 While Whitman declined to require the EPA to consider
costs in ambiguous sections of the CAA, the Court in Michigan v.
EPA limited this holding. 112 Whitman only stood for the idea that
the EPA should not read-in cost considerations when the statute
directs the EPA to regulate based on factors excluding costs. 113
Thus, the statute in Michigan v. EPA was too dissimilar for the
Court to extend its holding in Whitman. 114
The Court also makes some interesting analogies to highlight
what it sees as logical flaws in the EPA’s reasoning. 115 The EPA
justified its decision to not consider costs when initially deciding
whether HAP regulations were appropriate and necessary by
claiming it could consider costs when setting emissions
standards. 116 The Court quipped back that by the EPA’s logic,
someone could find it appropriate to buy a Ferrari without
considering costs, because he plans to think about costs when
considering extra features. 117 The analogy shows the Court’s
skepticism of any statutory construction that does not include a
cost-benefit analysis at the earliest point possible. 118

107. Id. at 2707–11.
108. Id. at 2708 (describing 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A)).
109. Id.
110. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 457.
111. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2709 (analyzing Whitman).
112. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 467 (citing Union Elec. Co. and General Motors
Corp. v. United States, 496 U.S. 530 (1990) in support of its holding);
Michigan v. EPA 135 S. Ct. at 2707.
113. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2709.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. The Court included another analogy in this section drawing from
the Fourth Amendment. Id. The Court discussed that just because the Fourth
Amendment requires searches to be “reasonable” and warrants to be
“supported by probable cause” does not mean warrants can be unreasonable.
Id. Just because 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1) excludes costs while 42 U.S.C. §
7412(n)(2) includes cost considerations does not mean the Court can read out
costs from 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1). Id.
118. Id.
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III. ANALYSIS: MICHIGAN V. EPA IS BAD PRECEDENT ON
MANY DIFFERENT LEVELS
While coal and oil power plants took measures to comply with
HAP regulations, industry groups and states challenged the same
rules in the courts. 119 The groups sustained their attack in the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, 120 and on appeal to the Supreme Court. 121 In striking
down the regulations, the Court misapprehended the larger
statutory context and misapplied precedent governing Chevron
deference cases. 122 Additionally, the opinion used the Chenery
doctrine, a well-known administrative law principle, to limit the
Court’s judicial review. 123 This application distorts the policy
considerations underlying the doctrine. 124 Nevertheless, Michigan
v. EPA is Supreme Court precedent and could have substantial
impacts on the Obama Administration’s Clean Power Plan. 125

A. Problems with the Court’s Michigan v. EPA Decision
Michigan v. EPA ignores many important parts of the
regulatory system for HAP emissions established by § 7412. 126 It
also never discussed the body of relevant case law which ignored
or downplayed cost consideration arguments as well. 127 The trend
119. See generally Wolff, supra note 8 (detailing industry compliance with
HAP regulations); see also Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2706 (listing the
industry’s challenge at the Supreme Court to HAP regulations); White Stallion
Energy Ctr., LLC 748 F.3d at 1233 (discussing the industry’s challenge at the
appellate level).
120. White Stallion Energy Ctr., LLC 748 F.3d at 1233 (challenging the
regulations at the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit).
121. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2706 (challenging the regulations at
the Supreme Court).
122. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2707–11 (reviewing statutory context
and the Whitman precedent).
123. Id. at 2710–11.
124. See Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116
YALE L.J. 952, 992–1005 (2007) (analyzing how Chenery promotes the nondelegation values of democratic accountability, non-arbitrary rule of law, and
judicial manageability).
125. See Carlson & Herzog, supra note 12, at 28–35 (framing the ultimate
fate of the Clean Power Plan as a question of whether the Court follows its
Util. Air Regulatory Group or EME Homer ruling).
126. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d) (2016) (describing the different ways to
categorize sources of pollution after the EPA decides the sources need
regulation).
127. See Whitman, 531 U.S. at 467–68 (refusing to find implicit cost
consideration in a CAA statute that did not explicitly direct the EPA to
consider costs); Union Elec. Co., 427 U.S. at 256 (declining to find that
economic considerations were implicit in the CAA’s NAAQS programs). But cf.
EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. at 1606–07 (allowing the EPA to
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in Chevron cases is to give deference to a federal agency’s
interpretation of statutes under the agency’s exclusive control. 128
However, Michigan v. EPA seems meddlesome in comparison to
other Chevron doctrine decisions.
1.

The EPA Considered Costs at Other Points in the Rule
Making Process

The majority in Michigan v. EPA misapprehended § 7412’s
larger statutory context, especially the ways in which the EPA
considered costs in devising HAP regulations. 129 According to the
statutory scheme, a stationary source subject to HAP regulations
must meet the MACT standard for its category. 130 This standard is
the average HAP emissions level for the best performing 12% of
pollution sources in the category. 131 The EPA has the discretion to
set beyond the floor standards that are more stringent than typical
MACT standards, but must consider costs in making that
decision. 132
For the dissent in Michigan v. EPA, this scheme provides
costs controls in at least two ways. 133 First, the EPA sets the
MACT standards at the level of the best performing market
actors. 134 Since these market actors were able to perform without
incurring excessive costs, it makes sense to conclude that other
market actors could also do so. 135 Both groups operate in the
similar market conditions, have a similar customer population,

tailor ambiguous sections of the CAA’s “Good Neighbor Provision” to avoid
imposing excessive costs on polluters); see also Chevron, 467 U.S. at 851–54
(detailing legislative history of CAA permit program as allowing the EPA to
balance economic and environmental interests).
128. See EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1603–04 (giving
Chevron deference to the EPA’s interpretation of a “Good Neighbor Provision”
statute that included cost considerations in setting emission reduction goals
for upwind states); Whitman, 531 U.S. at 468–70 (affirming the EPA’s
interpretation of NAAQS to exclude cost considerations); see also Chevron, 467
U.S. at 845 (allowing deference to the EPA’s “bubble concept” based on the
statutory definition of “stationary source”).
129. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2715–20 (Kagen, J. dissenting)
(listing the EPA’s cost considerations throughout the regulatory process).
130. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(1)(A) (2016).
131. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(3)(A) (2016). The EPA can set MACT standards
for source categories with less than 30 sources at the average achieved by the
best performing 5 sources as well. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(3)(B) (2016).
132. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(2) (2016); see also Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at
2715 (Kagen, J. dissenting) (detailing the regulatory process for HAP
emissions under 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)).
133. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2719–20 (Kagen, J. dissenting).
134. Id. at 2719 (arguing that since the MACT standards are set at the
best performing 12% of industry, there must be cost considerations in the
standards because that is how businesses make decisions).
135. Id.
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and face similar challenges in controlling air pollution. 136 Second,
§ 7412(d) gives the EPA wide discretion in establishing categories
and sub-categories for different polluters. 137 These subcategories
define the MACT standards themselves, and allow the EPA to
consider specific characteristics in the power market. 138 The EPA
can then define the MACT standards in ways that account for
industry compliance costs. 139
Indeed, the EPA exercised its discretion in multiple ways to
consider costs. 140 The Agency separated coal and oil plants into
discrete categories and further divided these sources based on the
processes the plants use to make energy. 141 The EPA then
proceeded to allow power plants to comply with the regulations
based on either input or output standards. 142 It also extended the
bubble concept, where the EPA aggregates emissions from all
sources of pollution at a site in determining compliance, to include
the regulation of power plants. 143 These are just some of the cost
considerations included in the rule. 144 Rebutting the majority’s
Ferrari analogy, the dissent reframed the cost issue in terms more
favorable to its reading of the overall context:
A better analogy might be to a car owner who decides without first
checking prices that it is “appropriate and necessary” to replace her
worn-out brake-pads, aware from prior experience that she has
ample time to comparison-shop and bring that purchase within her
budget. Faced with a serious hazard and an available remedy, EPA
moved forward like that sensible car owner, with a promise that it
would, and well-ground confidence that it could, take costs into
account down the line. 145

Given the many accommodations the EPA made for the coal
and oil utility industry, it is hard to fault the dissent for finding
the ruling making process to be more than solicitous to the
industry’s costs.

136. Id.
137. Id. at 2720.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. (noting that the plants were divided into plants burning high-rank
coal, plants burning low-rank virgin coal, plants that run on integrate
gasification, liquid oil units, and solid oil units).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. 2720–21. These system included accommodation for plants
primarily burning natural gas but that sometimes burn oil. Id. Sources with
construction, permitting, or labor challenges were given extra time to meet
HAP regulations too. Id.
145. Id. at 2725.
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Michigan v. EPA Fails to Give Deference to the EPA’s
Statutory Interpretation, Contrary to the Prevailing
Trend in Chevron Cases

The Court reviewed the EPA’s decision to regulate HAPs from
fossil fuel power plants under the Chevron framework. 146 Under
Chevron, the Court gives deference to a federal agency’s
interpretation of an ambiguous statute that it exclusively
administers if the interpretation is reasonable. 147 For the majority
in Michigan v. EPA, it was unreasonable to exclude costs
considerations when deciding to regulate. 148 Excluding costs opens
the door for regulations where the costs far outweigh the benefits,
in the majority’s opinion. 149
In both pre- and post-Chevron cases, the Court has rejected
arguments that would revoke the EPA’s statutory construction for
economic feasibility reasons. 150 For example, in Union Elec. Co. v.
EPA, a power plant challenged Missouri’s SIP on the grounds that
the plan was technologically and economically infeasible. 151
Reviewing the criteria the CAA directed the EPA to consider, the
Court concluded that the EPA should not consider economic
feasibility in reviewing a state plan. 152 The Court came to a
similar conclusion in Whitman 153 with Justice Scalia, the author of
Michigan v. EPA’s majority opinion. The challengers in Whitman
argued the terms “requisite” and “adequate margin” in the
statutes directing the EPA to regulate ambient air quality
standards allowed the Agency to consider implementation costs. 154
While the Michigan v. EPA court tried to limit Whitman’s ruling,
the Whitman court found it implausible that a few words in the
NAAQS statutes allowed for cost considerations. 155

146. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2707.
147. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840. Chevron was concerned with the EPA
regulation that adopted a plant-wide definition of the term “new or modified
major stationary source” for permitting purposes. Id. This allowed polluters to
install new equipment so long as the installation did not increase the total
emissions from the plant. Id. The Court found that “stationary source” was
ambiguous in the CAA and upheld the EPA’s definition as a reasonable
construction of the statute. Id. at 845 (holding that Congress did have any
specific intention on the applicability of the bubble concept).
148. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2707.
149. Id.
150. See Union Elec. Co., 427 U.S. at 488 (holding that the EPA need not
consider costs in its NAAQS program); see also Whitman, 531 U.S. at 469
(rejecting an argument that Congress included implementation cost
considerations when directing the EPA to set ambient air quality standards
“requisite to protect the public health”).
151. Union Elec. Co., 427 U.S. at 256.
152. Id. at 488.
153. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 471.
154. Id. at 468.
155. Id. at 469; Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2709.
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The Chevron framework has limits that do not fit well with
the statute at issue in Michigan v. EPA. 156 FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp. sets out the major questions exception
to Chevron deference. 157 Congress presumptively delegates
authority to government agencies when it writes ambiguous
statutes. 158 However, it is unlikely that Congress would delegate
authority to a government agency to regulate a significant part of
the economy or resolve an important political question. 159
Congress traditionally addresses major questions through
lawmaking. 160 Additionally, one usually must strain statutory
interpretation tools to find answer to major questions in existing
legislation. 161 The Court does not believe that Congress would
delegate enormous power through cryptic statutory language. 162
Therefore, if a government agency uses a vague statute to solve a
major question, the agency must find explicit statutory authority
for its action. 163
Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA is perhaps the most
relevant application of the major questions doctrine to a CAA
issue. 164 Utility Air Regulatory Group addressed the question of
whether the authority to regulate greenhouse gases (GHG) as an
air pollutant extended to the CAA’s Prevention of Significant
Deterioration (PSD) program. 165 PSD essentially prevents
stationary sources from ruining an area’s NAAQS attainment by
requiring stationary sources to install best available control
technology. 166 The proposed regulations could potentially cover
thousands of sources not contemplated under the 1990 CAA
Amendments. 167 Additionally, the sources were everyday
156. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 159–60; MCI
Telecomm. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 231 (1994) (holding that
Congress did not delegate to the FCC the power to make telephone company
rate filings voluntary through the statutory term “modify”); see also Util. Air
Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2444 (applying Brown & Williamson to strike
down the EPA’s attempt to regulate GHG under its PSD and Title V
permitting).
157. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 159–60 (holding that
the FDA did not have statutory grounds to regulate cigarettes under the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 160.
160. Id.
161. See id. (expressing skepticism that Congress could delegate power to
FDA through a cryptic statutory construction).
162. See Whitman, 531 U.S. at 468 (analogizing that Congress does not
hide elephants in mouse holes).
163. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp, 529 U.S. at 160.
164. Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2444.
165. Id. at 2434.
166. Id. at 2435.
167. Id. at 2444; see also BRYNER, supra note 18, at 123–28 (providing an
overview of the major parts of the Act and demonstrating no attention given to
GHG emissions).
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businesses, like hotels or small retailers, which the EPA never
regulated in the past. 168 To adjust to these inequities, the EPA
limited its authority to stationary sources that emit over 100,000
tons of CO2 a year. 169 Even though the EPA tailored its rule to only
cover major CO2 polluters, the Court struck down the law. 170 They
found that because the EPA’s rule covered such a large portion of
the economy, its underlying statutory construction must be
unreasonable. 171
Unlike the permitting requirements at issue in Utility Air
Regulatory Group, § 7412(n) clearly anticipates HAP regulation of
coal and oil power plants. 172 A close reading of the statute and the
legislative history proves this point. 173 Additionally, the HAP
regulations at issue in Michigan v. EPA would not substantially
change the relationship between the EPA and the utility
industry. 174 EPA closely regulates coal and oil power plants under
other CAA provisions. 175 HAP regulations are more similar to the
regulations the Utility Air Regulatory Group Court did uphold. 176
There, the Court allowed the EPA to regulate GHG emissions for
sources already covered by the PSD program. 177 The EPA already
regulates coal and oil power plants like these already regulated
sources at issue in Utility Air Regulatory Group. 178 In light of the
168. Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2436.
169. Id. at 2437.
170. Id. at 2444.
171. Id.
172. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1) (2016); see also Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at
2709, 2714 (showing that both the majority and dissent in Michigan v. EPA
agree that the EPA should consider costs at some point when promulgating
HAP regulations); New Jersey, 517 F.3d at 582 (implying that Congress meant
to regulate HAPs under § 7412(n)(1)).
173. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1) (2016) (showing that HAP regulations of
coal and oil power plants was authorized under the specific subparagraph of
the statute and not the section); see also Legislative History, supra note 92, at
1415 (detailing that Congress subjected coal and oil power plants to extensive
regulations under the CAA acid rain provisions).
174. See Wolff, supra note 8 (proving that the coal and oil industry has
already complied with the HAP regulations at issue in Michigan v. EPA); see
also Emission Control Companies as Amici Curiae, supra note 8, at 19–20
(listing the proportion of the coal industry that complied with HAP
regulations).
175. See Legislative History, supra note 92, at 1415 (detailing CAA acid
rain controls); see also Wolff, supra note 8 (asserting industry compliance with
HAP regulations).
176. Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2449 (characterizing GHG
emissions controls for “anyway” sources as properly extending the EPA’s
jurisdiction over already-regulated companies).
177. Id.
178. Id.; see also BRYNER, supra note 18, at 126–27, 146–47 (describing
acid rain controls and a cap-and-trade system to limit sulfur dioxide, a
chemical contributing to acid rain); Legislative History, supra note 92, at
1416–17 (recording the Congressional debate concerning HAP regulations for
coal and oil power plants).
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Utility Air Regulatory Group holding, the HAP rules were not a
drastic expansion of the EPA’s authority. 179
The Michigan v. EPA decision may be a reaction to the EME
Homer City Generation holding. 180 The late Justice Scalia wrote a
scathing dissent in that case criticizing the majority for allowing
the EPA to consider costs in implementing the CAA’s Good
Neighbor Provisions. 181 He characterized the regulations as an
“undemocratic revision of the Clean Air Act,” and claimed the EPA
manufactured a statutory ambiguity to include cost-benefit
analysis in its regulations. 182 Furthermore, the dissent in EME
Homer City Generation described Whitman as demanding a
textual commitment to consider costs to allow the EPA to consider
costs in regulations. 183 In Michigan v. EPA, Whitman’s textual
commitment rule morphed into a toothless principle allowing the
EPA to consider costs where there is no language mandating cost
considerations at all. 184 Given the contradictory positions Justice
Scalia took in EME Homer City Generation, L.P. and Michigan v.
EPA, it is certainly plausible to consider the later decision as a
reaction to the former. 185 It seems Justice Scalia is saying if the
EPA wants to consider costs, then that is what they will get. 186
Along with these reasons, the Michigan v. EPA opinion contains a
novel application of a well-known administrative law principle —
the Chenery doctrine. 187
179. Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2448.
180. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. at 1607 (allowing the
EPA to consider costs in issuing Transport Rule to comply with CAA “Good
Neighbor” provisions).
181. Id. at 1611 (Scalia, J. dissenting). The Good Neighbor Provisions
require upwind states to modify their SIP to account for pollution blown
through the air into downwind states. Id. at 1595.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1616.
184. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2709.
185. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. at 1616; Michigan v.
EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2709. It is helpful to look at Justice Scalia’s
characterizations of the American Trucking holding one after another to see
that his views truly are contradictory in these cases. “American Trucking thus
demanded a textual commitment of authority to the EPA to consider costs.”
EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. at 1616 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
“American Trucking thus establishes the modest principle that where the
[CAA] expressly directs EPA to regulate on the basis of a factor that . . . does
not include costs, the Act normally should not be read as . . . allowing the
Agency to consider costs.” Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2709. American
Trucking cannot both demand textual authority to allow the EPA to consider
costs, and at the same time, permit the EPA to consider such costs without
specific textual authority. The holdings contradict each other.
186. Compare EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. at 1616
(Scalia, J. dissenting) (holding that American Trucking demands textual
authority to consider costs) with Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2709
(mandating that the EPA consider costs).
187. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2710 (applying Chenery doctrine).
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B. Michigan v. EPA Uses a Worrisome Application of
the Chenery Doctrine
The Court in Michigan v. EPA used the Chenery doctrine to
exclude from judicial review the points in the EPA’s rule where the
Agency considered costs. 188 This doctrine states that reviewing
courts must judge agency decisions only on the reasons the agency
gave in their initial decision. 189 Courts cannot allow post hoc
rationalizations of agency decisions. 190 The Court held that it
would violate Chenery to evaluate the cost considerations the EPA
made after deciding to regulate HAPs from coal and oil power
plants. 191 This application of the Chenery doctrine distorts the
doctrine’s policies and unreasonably limits judicial review.
1.

Chenery Defined

Chenery involved a reorganization of a utility company under
the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935. 192 Respondents
were managers of the old corporation who purchased preferred
stock in order to maintain control of the company. 193 The law
required the SEC to approve the merger, and it found respondents
violated their duty as fiduciaries by purchasing new company
stock. 194 The respondents could not participate in the merger
without paying a penalty. 195 The Chenery Court’s review of the
SEC’s case citations showed that respondents had no fiduciary
duty. 196 While the SEC advocated other reasons to penalize
respondent’s purchases, the Court was unwilling to address these
arguments. 197 “The grounds upon which an administrative order
must be judged are those upon which the record discloses that its
action was based.” 198
Since the decision, the Chenery doctrine has become a
pervasive principle of administrative law. 199 The Supreme Court
188. Id. at 2710. The dissent goes on to express skepticism about whether
the EPA’s post determination costs consideration are enough to ensure cost
effective regulation. Id. at 2711.
189. Chenery, 318 U.S. at 81–87
190. Id.
191. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2710.
192. Chenery, 318 U.S. at 81–87.
193. Id. at 84–85.
194. Id. at 85.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 88–89.
197. Id. at 90–93.
198. Id. at 88.
199. See Bryan C. Bond, Note, Taking It on the Chenery: Should the
Principles of Chenery I Apply in Social Security Disability Cases? 86 NOTRE
DAME L. REV . 2157, 2158–61 (2011) (explaining the ubiquitous nature of
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cited the principle on many different occasions since 1942. 200
Appellate courts have used the doctrine in a variety of
administrative settings as well. 201 When the government justifies
an administrative action on grounds not advanced at the
administrative level, courts typically use Chenery to bar these post
hoc rationalizations. 202
There are limits to the Chenery doctrine, however. First, in a
1945 follow-up case also captioned as SEC v. Chenery Corp. 203
(Chenery II), the Court clarified that the Chenery doctrine only
applies to determinations that Congress delegated to an agency’s
exclusive jurisdiction. 204 Second, the doctrine does not apply when
an agency’s action is compelled by statute or case law. 205 Applying
the doctrine in that scenario produces a formality where the Court
remands a case solely for the agency to re-draft its opinion using
the correct rationale. 206
2.

The Court’s Use of Chenery Distorts the Doctrine’s Policy
Benefits and Unreasonably Limits Judicial Review

One reason to question the Michigan v. EPA majority’s
application of the Chenery doctrine is that the EPA’s HAP
regulations may not change in response to the decision. The Court
Chenery in administrative law).
200. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfr. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (noting that the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration could not raise new reasons for declining a mandatory airbag
standard that the Administration did not raise at the administrative level);
Bond, supra note 199, at 2158–61 (detailing many applications of the Chenery
doctrine).
201. Parker v. Astrue, 597 F.3d 920, 922 (7th Cir. 2010) (applying Chenery
to exclude argument Social Security Administration’s (SSA) lawyer made on
appeal that were not included at the administrative level); Moab v. Gonzales,
500 F.3d 656, 659–60 (7th Cir. 2007) (utilizing Chenery to limit judicial review
of Bureau of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denial of asylum application to the
grounds BIA advanced in its decision).
202. See Parker, 597 F.3d at 922 (excluding SAA argument on appellate
review); State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 (rejecting newly raised reasons for
declining mandatory airbag standard); see also Bond, supra note 199, at 2158–
61 (describing Chenery doctrine).
203. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
204. Id. at 196 (1947) (limiting Chenery to decisions “which an
administrative agency alone is authorized to make”); see also Stack, supra
note 124, at 965–67 (describing the Chenery doctrine’s limits).
205. Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S.
527, 544–45 (finding that Chenery was irrelevant to review of a utility contract
to purchase power because under case law the contracts are presumed just
and reasonable); see also Stack, supra note 124, at 966 (discussing times when
applying Chenery may be inappropriate); Judge Henry J. Friendly, Chenery
Revisited: Reflections on Reversal and Remand of Administrative Orders, 1969
DUKE L.J. 199, 210 (1969) (claiming that courts should not invoke Chenery
when its application is a mere formality).
206. Stack, supra note 124, at 966; Friendly, supra note 205, at 210.

2016]

At What Costs?

1279

of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled that the HAPs rules
remain in effect while the EPA conducts a more detailed costbenefit analysis. 207 Many people do not expect the Court’s
Michigan v. EPA ruling to affect the ultimate fate of the HAPs
rule. 208 Courts should not invoke Chenery when the final result of
administrative actions are not in dispute. 209 Since it is likely that
HAP regulations will meet the Court’s standards, the Court erred
in invoking Chenery to limit its judicial review. 210 Beyond this,
there are additional reasons to question the Court’s application of
the Chenery doctrine.
The Chenery doctrine supports many policy considerations. 211
Chenery promotes democratic accountability because it prevents
government agencies from changing their justifications for
regulatory decisions. 212 Congress, the President, and the public
must know exactly why the agency is taking action in order to
debate the action accordingly. 213 The doctrine also promotes a nonarbitrary rule of law because the government agency must make
well-reasoned decisions or else face reversal by the courts. 214
Finally, Chenery aids judicial management by narrowing the
issues for courts to decide when reviewing agency actions similar
to the way trial objections preserve legal issues on appeals. 215
The Michigan v. EPA decision, in contrast, does not promote
these policy goals. The EPA’s final agency action did not prevent
the public from understanding its position on HAP regulations. 216
While the final agency action is long and dense, it contains a
detailed overview of the statutory authority supporting the EPA’s
207. Hananel, supra note 7.
208. See Phillip A. Wallach, Michigan v. EPA: Competing Conceptions of
Deference Due to Administrative Agencies, BROOKING INST. (Oct. 23, 2015, 2:37
PM), www.brookings.edu/blogs/fixgov/posts/2015/06/29-michigan-v-epa-admini
strative-deference-wallach (questioning the practical effect of the Michigan v.
EPA decision); see also Brad Plumer, The Supreme Court Throws a Wrench in
the EPA’s Crackdown on Mercury Pollution, VOX (Oct. 23, 2015, 2:38 PM),
www.vox.com/2015/6/29/8861167/supreme-court-EPA-ruling-mercury-coal
(predicting that the HAP regulations in Michigan v. EPA ultimately will
remain in force).
209. See Friendly, supra note 195, at 210 (explaining that it is
inappropriate to invoke Chenery when the legitimacy of a final agency action
is not in question).
210. See Wallach, supra note 198 (questioning the effect of the Michigan v.
EPA decision on HAP regulation of coal and oil power plants).
211. Stack, supra note 124, at 991–1000.
212. Id. at 991–96.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 996–98.
215. Id. at 998–1000.
216. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants From
Coal and Oil Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg.
9304, 9311–67 (Feb. 16, 2012) (codified at 40 C.F.R. Pts. 60, 63) [hereinafter
HAPs Regulations]. (detailing statutory authority for HAP regulations of coal
and oil power plants).
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decision. 217 A motivated Congressman or interested public citizen
could understand the EPA’s position through reading the final
action document. The public could hold the Agency accountable for
its action by voting against the Agency’s ultimate boss, the
President. The EPA’s action was comprehensive and transparent,
which gives the public what it needs to hold the Agency
accountable through the democratic process.
The Michigan v. EPA court chose to focus only on selected
portions of the EPA’s final rule. 218 Their decision seems arbitrary
given that the EPA did exactly what the Court wanted the Agency
to do in order to provide reasonable statutory interpretation. 219
The Agency issued a cost-benefit analysis that showed the HAP
regulations were cost efficient. 220 Chenery supports non-arbitrary
rule of law because when agencies give reasons for decisions they
limit agency discretion to the scope of those reasons. 221 If the
Court does not support an outcome within the scope of the reasons
provided by the Agency, the non-arbitrary benefit of the Chenery
doctrine falls apart. 222 The Court must affirm when agencies act
within the scope of a given rationale for a decision. 223 That did not
occur in the Michigan v. EPA case.
Finally, by refusing to address an adequate ground for
affirmance, the Court in Michigan v. EPA marginalized another
benefit of Chenery: judicial manageability. 224 Agencies cannot
know if the Court will evaluate all asserted grounds for a decision
after Michigan v. EPA. 225 The Michigan v. EPA court ignored the
Agency’s rationale that satisfied the Court’s demands. 226 Thus, the
EPA could not preserve their cost consideration argument in the
same way a party in litigation preserves a legal argument at trial.
To continue the trial analogy, the EPA asserted its objection by
including cost considerations, but the Court used the Chenery

217. Id.
218. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2706.
219. HAPs Regulations, supra note 216, at 9306.
220. Id. at 9327.
221. Stack, supra note 88, at 997.
222. See HAPs Regulations, supra note 216, at 9306 (explaining required
cost-benefit analysis that accompanied HAP regulation for coal and oil power
plants).
223. See Stack, supra note 88, at 997 (describing the non-arbitrary rule of
law benefit of the Chenery doctrine).
224. See HAPs Regulations, supra note 216, at 9306 (addressing costs and
benefits of HAPs regulations).
225. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2717–18 (Kagen, J. dissenting)
(criticizing the majority for focusing single mindedly on only one part of the
regulatory process).
226. HAPs Regulations, supra note 216, at 9327 (detailing costs and
benefits of HAP regulations).
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doctrine to ignore the objection. 227 This undermines the judicial
management policy in the Chenery doctrine.
Chenery is also an important part of Chevron deference. 228
Implicit in Chevron deference is the idea that administrative
agencies consider all possible statutory interpretations before
deciding which to follow. Chenery ensures that government
agencies thoroughly analyze unclear statutes before taking
action. 229 Administrative agencies cannot advance new reasons
during judicial review supporting their statutory construction. 230
Chenery mandates that courts only consider arguments advanced
at the administrative level. 231
The Court’s application of Chenery in Michigan v. EPA
distorts these principles because the EPA did work through the
problems in § 7412(n). 232 The EPA’s final ruling responded to over
900,000 public comments and explained its statutory authority
numerous times. 233 Specifically, the ruling stated that the EPA
would not consider costs in initially deciding whether to regulate
because there was no clear congressional mandate for cost
considerations. 234 This was a reasonable argument to make
against a statutory interpretation including cost considerations
because it repeated the Court’s holding in Whitman. 235 If the point
of Chenery in a Chevron case is to ensure that the government
agency works through the problems presented by the statute, then
the EPA surely succeeded After all, what else could the Agency
have done to satisfy the Court?
The dissent in Michigan v. EPA accused the majority of
unreasonably staring fixedly at only one part of the EPA’s rule. 236
Given the majority’s application of the Chenery doctrine, the
criticism that the majority unreasonably limited its judicial review
is apt. 237 The Michigan v. EPA majority’s reasoning promoted none
of the policies and principles underlying the Chenery doctrine. 238
The majority also ignored many instances where the EPA
considered costs in setting its regulations. 239 The Court refused to
227. See id. (explaining cost considerations in HAP regulations); see also
Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2710 (invoking the Chenery doctrine to ignore
agency cost considerations).
228. Stack, supra note 124, at 1004–06.
229. Id. at 1005.
230. Chenery, 318 U.S. at 88.
231. Id.
232. See generally HAPs Regulations, supra 216, (reviewing the EPA’s
decision in exhaustive detail).
233. Id. at 9310.
234. Id. at 9327.
235. See Whitman, 531 U.S. at 468 (holding that the EPA must have a
clear statutory directive to consider costs in CAA rule making).
236. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2718 (Kagen, J. dissenting).
237. Id. at 2710
238. Supra Part III.B.
239. HAPs Regulations, supra 216, at 9305.
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analyze the EPA’s decision in its entirety, and used the Chenery
doctrine to justify this failure. 240
In addition to this questionable application of the Chenery
doctrine, Michigan v. EPA hinged upon the Court’s interpretation
of a CAA statute. 241 It could therefore effect the outcome of legal
challenges to the Clean Power Plan — the EPA’s regulation of
carbon emissions from power plants under another CAA statute. 242

C. Michigan v. EPA Could Have Substantial Effects on
the Clean Power Plan
The Clean Power Plan is a central part of the Obama
Administration’s environmental policy. 243 Under the new rules,
states generally must choose from a variety of options to meet
GHG emissions goals on a statewide basis. 244 The EPA issued its
final rules for the plan on October 23, 2015, and twenty-four states
immediately challenged the plan. 245 These states question the
Clean Power Plan’s legality on constitutional and statutory
grounds. 246 The Clean Power Plan has serious statutory problems
because the House and Senate passed different versions of the
statute the EPA relied on in drafting the regulations. 247 These

240. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2710.
241. See id. at 2705 (summarizing the legislative history of § 7412(n)).
242. Carbon Pollution Emissions Guidelines for Existing Stationary
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64662, 64710 (Oct. 23,
2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. Pt. 60) [hereinafter Clean Power Plan
Regulations].
243. EXECUTIVE O FFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT’S CLIMATE
ACTION
PLAN
6
(2013),
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/image/
president27sclimateactionplan.pdf, (noting that GHG emissions from the
power sector account for 1/3 of total emissions); see also Clean Power Plan
Regulations, supra note 242, at 64665 (characterizing the rules as a major part
of President Obama’s Climate Action Plan).
244. Mario Loyola, Federal Coercion and the EPA’s Clean Power Plan, THE
ATLANTIC (Oct. 24, 2015, 6:05 PM), www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive
/2015/05/federal-coercion-and-the-epas-clean-power-plan/393389/
(explaining
the Clean Power Plan); Clean Power Plan Regulations, supra note 242, at
64665.
245. Clean Power Plan Regulations, supra note 242, at 64462; Petition for
Review at 2, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 23, 2015),
www.ago.wv.gov/pressroom/2015/Documents/File-stamped%20petition%20151363%20%28M0108546xCECC6%29-c1.pdf (broadly outlining challenges to
the Clean Power Plan).
246. Petition for Review, supra note 245, at 2.
247. Clean Power Plan Regulations, supra note 242, at 64712 (analyzing
two versions of 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d) passed with the 1990 CAA Amendments);
see also Anthony Adragna & Andrew Childers, Clean Power Plan Implication
Unclear After Supreme Court Denies Agency Deference, BLOOMBERG, June 30,
2015,
www.bna.com/clean-power-plan-n17179928897/
(addressing
the
conflicting versions of 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)).
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states may use the Michigan decision as part of its strategy to
overturn the Clean Power Plan on major question grounds. 248
1.

The Clean Power Plan

The Clean Power Plan is the EPA’s and President Obama’s
strategy to reduce GHG emissions from coal and oil power
plants. 249 First, the EPA establishes aggregate GHG emissions
targets from power plants for each state. 250 The regulations
contain various ways that states can meet these emissions
limits. 251 States can reduce GHG emissions from existing fossil
fuel burning power plants, convert coal power plants to natural
gas power plants, or implement beyond-the-fence-line programs to
reduce GHG emissions overall. 252 For example, assume the EPA
mandates that a state must not emit more than 10 units of GHGs,
and a state currently emits 12 units of GHGs. The state can then:
(1) control GHG emissions from fossil fuel power plants by 2 units;
(2) convert the equivalent of 2 units of coal power plants to cleaner
burning natural gas power plants; (3) replace 2 units of fossil fuel
emissions with zero emissions sources like wind power; or (4)
reduce electricity consumption by 2 GHG units. 253 The rules give
states the choice to either submit their own plans or have the EPA
design a plan for them. 254 In this way, the Clean Power Plan
mirrors the federalist system the CAA utilizes to meet NAAQS
standards. 255 In a companion rule making proceeding, EPA
established emissions standards for new fossil fuel power
plants. 256 These standards set emissions limits for any fossil fuel
248. Petition for Review, supra note 245, at 2. (asserting challenges to the
Clean Power Plan on constitutional and statutory grounds).
249. THE PRESIDENT’S CLIMATE ACTION PLAN, supra note 243, at 6; Clean
Power Plan Regulations, supra note 242, at 64665.
250. Clean Power Plan Regulations, supra note 242, at 64663 (reviewing
GHG emissions standards for fossil fuel burning power plants and rate-based
and mass-based emissions goals for states).
251. Id. at 64666. The three choices for state plans include increasing
energy efficiency at existing power plants, power capacity from lower-emitting
natural gas plants, or capacity from renewable sources. Id. States can also
develop cap-and-trade systems individually or combined with other states to
meet their state plan goals. Id. at 64663; see also Loyola, supra note 244
(listing Clean Power Plan compliance options).
252. Clean Power Plan Regulations, supra note 242, at 64665-67. These
programs involve increasing demand-side energy efficiency. Id.
253. See id. at 64666 (explaining compliance options). This hypothetical
explains compliance options from a mass based emissions perspective. Id. at
64663.
254. Id. at 64666-67; see also Patrick Parenteau, The Clean Power Plan
(Sept.
29,
2015
10:15
AM),
Will
Survive:
Part
2,
LAW360
www.law360.com/articles/704048/the-clean-power-plan-will-survive-part-2?art
icle_related_content=1 (detailing the Clean Power Plan’s structure).
255. Parenteau, supra note 254.
256. Standard of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From New,
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fired power plants a utility builds in the future. 257
The EPA claimed statutory authority to issue the Clean
Power Plan under 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d). 258 The statute requires the
EPA to establish regulations for any pollutant not controlled by
NAAQS standards or that is not regulated under the § 7412 HAP
standards. 259 Essentially, the EPA construes 42 U.S.C. § 7411 as
providing a safety valve for regulating pollutants otherwise not
covered by the NAAQS or HAP programs. 260 In Massachusetts v.
EPA, the Court established that the term “any pollutant” under
the CAA includes GHG emissions. 261 This decision triggered a
requirement to regulate GHGs under § 7411. 262
However, the 1990 CAA Amendments and previous versions
of the CAA did not directly envision regulations for GHG
emissions. 263 There are no specific titles in the legislation
addressing climate change. 264 While one can read § 7411(d) to
cover GHG emissions, the EPA did not historically use the section
to regulate substantial parts of the economy. 265 Parts of the Clean
Power Plan envision changes in state laws too. 266 In light of these
Modified, and Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating
Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64510, 64512 (Oct. 23, 2015) [hereinafter New Source
Greenhouse Gas Standards]
257. Id.
258. Clean Power Plan Regulations, supra note 242, at 64710.
259. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1) (2016).
260. Clean Power Plan Regulations, supra note 242, at 64715 (examining
its statutory construction as comprehensive relative to HAP and NAAQS
provisions); Patrick Parenteau, The Clean Power Plan Will Survive: Part 1,
LAW360 (Sept. 28, 2015, 11:37 AM), www.law360.com/articles/704046/theclean-power-plan-will-survive-part-1?article_related_content=1
(noting
the
relationship between § 7411, HAP regulations and the NAAQS program).
261. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007) (finding that GHG fit
within the CAA’s definition of “air pollutant”).
262. Clean Power Plan Regulations, supra note 242, at 64664 (explaining
purpose of the rule as reducing GHG emissions from fossil fuel-fired power
plants).
263. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 529 (citing the EPA’s previous
views that the CAA did not address GHG emissions). See generally Clean Air
Amendments of 1990, supra note 13.
264. BRYNER, supra note 18, at 123–28 (listing the major sections of the
1990 CAA Amendments).
265. Groten, supra note 12, at 10117 (detailing the four other occasions the
EPA invoked § 7411(d) to regulate air pollution).
266. Clean Power Plan Regulations, supra note 242, at 64664, 64712–15
(explaining the House and Senate versions of § 7411(d) and different
interpretations of each amendment). The House version proscribes regulation
for any air pollutant not covered by the NAAQS program or an air pollutant
emitted from a source covered under § 7412. Id. at 64713 (emphasis added).
One argument is that since the law covers power plants under § 7412, this
exempts them from § 7411(d) regulation. Groten, supra note 12, at 10119–22.
This comment does not address this argument because the argument is
secondary to the overall Chevron deference question. See Parenteau, supra
note 260 (explaining that ambiguous statutes trigger Chevron deference). The
conflicting versions of § 7411(d) mean that the statute is ambiguous. Id.; Clean
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issues, many states bristled at the idea of the EPA forcing them to
regulate GHG emissions from fossil fuel power plants. 267 These
states are pursuing legal action to strike down the Clean Power
Plan, and it’s likely that the Supreme Court will decide the case. 268
2.

Michigan v. EPA Shows the Supreme Court’s Lack of
Deference to the EPA’s Decisions

To understand how Clean Power Plan challengers might use
Michigan v. EPA, one must remember the distinction between
within-the-fence-line
and beyond-the-fence-line regulations. 269
Within-the-fence-line regulations refers to regulating a power
plants’ GHG emissions through equipment and controls inside the
power plant. 270 It is the first compliance option for the
hypothetical
state
discussed
above.
Beyond-the-fence-line
regulations are measures like building renewable sources of
electricity or installing energy efficient controls for consumers that
limit a state’s GHG emissions. 271 These are the third and fourth
options for the hypothetical state. The CAA traditionally
addressed within-the-fence-line regulations. 272 This departure
from within-the-fence-line regulations may lead to a major
questions doctrine challenge.
Beyond-the-fence-line regulations are similar to the rules at
issue FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. 273 Fossil fuel

Power Plan Regulations, supra note 242, at 64714. The real issue facing the
Court then will be whether to give Chevron deference to the EPA in light of
the ambiguities in § 7411(d). Parenteau, supra note 260.
267. Valerie Volcovici & Lawrence Hurley, U.S. States, Business Groups
Challenge Obama’s Carbon Rules in Court, REUTERS, Oct. 23, 2015,
www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-climatechange-lawsuit-idUSKCN0SH1JH201
51023.
268. Id.; Parenteau, supra note 260. Justice Scalia’s death may change the
outcome of the Clean Power Plan. Robin Bravender, Scalia’s death ‘puts all the
action’ in D.C. Circuit, E & E PUBLISHING, LLC, Feb. 19, 2016,
www.eenews.net/stories/1060032665. If there are not nine justices on the
Supreme Court when it rules on the Clean Power Plan, it is possible that the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeal’s decision will govern the outcome of the case. Id.
269. See Clean Power Plan Regulations, supra note 242, at 64665 (listing
examples of beyond the fence-line regulations); Loyola, supra note 244 (noting
the uniqueness of beyond the fence-line regulations in the EPA’s history).
270. See Loyola, supra note 244 (describing difference between within-thefence-line and outside-the-fence-line regulations).
271. Id.
272. See Scott. C. Oostdyk, A Constitutional Challenge to EPA’s ‘Clean
(Oct. 27, 2015, 1:05 PM), www.law360.
Power
Plan’,
LAW360
com/articles/590762/a-constitutional-challenge-to-epa-s-clean-power-plan
(detailing the one time in the EPA’s history where the Agency tried to regulate
beyond-the-fence-line); see also Parenteau, supra note 254 (noting the
uniqueness of beyond-the-fence-line regulations but concluding that the
regulations are willful state choices to meet federal goals).
273. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 159–61.
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power generation accounts for a substantial part of the nation’s
energy portfolio. 274 The utility industry as a whole is larger than
the tobacco industry and both are pervasive parts of the U.S.
economy. 275 The FDA in Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. used
a similar avoidance strategy like the EPA used with the Clean
Power Plan to limit their power. 276 In Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., the FDA only required package disclosures on
cigarettes even when their statutory interpretation suggested they
could ban cigarettes outright. 277 The Clean Power Plan employs a
similar avoidance strategy utilizing cooperative federalism to let
states design GHG emissions reduction plans. 278 However, the
EPA’s interpretation of the statutory language implies that the
Agency could implement emissions controls directly on fossil fuel
power plants. 279 By self-limiting their authority, both agencies
imply that Congress really did not intend the agencies’ power to
extend as far as the agencies claim. 280
The Court’s holding in Utility Air Regulatory Group may
preview the eventual fate of most of the Clean Power Plan. 281 Both
the Clean Power Plan and the regulations in Utility Air Regulatory
Group are outgrowths of the Massachusetts v. EPA decision. 282 The
two cases are similar in that they both involve the EPA using
regulatory strategies that are novel compared to the Agency’s
274. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., FREQUENTLY ASKED Q UESTIONS:
WHAT IS U.S. ELECTRICITY G ENERATION BY ENERGY SOURCES? (Apr. 1, 2016),
www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=427&t=3 (showing that coal accounted for
39% of total U.S. electricity generation in 2014, while petroleum accounted for
1%).
275. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE , BUREAU OF ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS, GDP BY INDUSTRY, (Sept. 5, 2016), www.bea.gov/industry
/gdpbyind_data.htm (listing the value of the utility industry in 2014 at
approximately $291 billion, while the value of the food and tobacco
manufacturing sector was around $235 billion).
276. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 136–40 (showing that
FDA’s statutory construction implied that the Agency should ban cigarettes,
but the Agency decided against a ban because of fear of health effects of
withdrawal symptoms).
277. Id.
278. See Clean Power Plan Regulations, supra note 242, at 64663
(describing latitude states have in meeting Clean Power Plan emissions
requirements).
279. Id.
280. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 136–40 (limiting
regulations over cigarettes); see also Clean Power Plan Regulations, supra note
243, at 64663 (reviewing system of cooperative federalism to meet GHG
emissions reduction targets).
281. See Util. Air Regulation Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2444 (rejecting PSD
permitting requirements for GHG emissions on major questions grounds).
282. See Clean Power Plan Regulations, supra note 242, at 64664
(characterizing the Clean Power Plan as an effort to regulate carbon emissions
from fossil fuel power plants); see also Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at
2436 (linking Massachusetts decision and subsequent efforts to regulate GHG
emissions).
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traditional actions. 283 This is especially true for beyond-the-fenceline regulations in the Clean Power Plan. 284 Because of its
expansive nature, the Court may characterize the Clean Power
Plan as the EPA usurping regulatory authority from Congress
over an important political question. 285 This would essentially
mirror Utility Air Regulatory Group’s main holding. 286
What about within-the-fence-line regulations aimed at
reducing GHG emissions from new or modified fossil fuel power
plants? This action is more in line with the EPA’s traditional
regulatory actions. It may be the point where Michigan v. EPA
could most effect the outcome of a Clean Power Plan challenge.
The within-the-fence-line emissions limits depend on fossil fuel
burning power plants implementing carbon capture and
sequestration (CCS) and supercritical pulverized coal (SCPC)
technologies. 287 There is a great deal of uncertainty surrounding
CCS technology particularly because the power industry has not
adopted the technology on a large scale. 288 Installing CCS
technology is expensive for power companies as well. 289 If the
Court feels that the EPA has not been solicitous enough to the
power industry’s compliance costs, it may turn to Michigan v. EPA
to knock out this final part of the Clean Power Plan.
There are some signs the EPA is adjusting to the Court’s
holding in Michigan v. EPA. 290 Both final agency actions
establishing the Clean Power Plan and emission controls for new
fossil fuel plants include cost considerations. 291 The rulings show
adjustment and responses to public comments concerning
283. See Oostdyk, supra note 272 (describing the one other time in the
EPA’s history when the Agency attempted beyond-the-fence-line regulations);
Parenteau, supra note 244 (noting uniqueness of beyond-the-fence-line
regulations but disagreeing that these regulations violate the Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Co. holding); see also BRYNER, supra note 18, at 123-28
(reviewing the structure of the 1990 CAA Amendments).
284. See Groten, supra note 12, at 10124-25 (analyzing the link between
Util. Air Regulatory Group and beyond-the-fence-line regulations).
285. Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2444.
286. See id. (striking down PSD permitting requirements for GHG
emissions).
287. New Source Greenhouse Gas Standards, supra note 256, at 64512.
288. See Kevin Bullis, The Cost of Limiting Climate Change Could Double
Without Carbon Capture Technology, MIT TECH. REV . (Oct. 27, 2015, 4:10
PM),
www.technologyreview.com/news/526646/the-cost-of-limiting-climatechange-could-double-without-carbon-capture-technology/
(explaining
importance of CCS technology for addressing climate change but emphasizing
the lack of scale in industry’s use of the technology).
289. New Source Greenhouse Gas Standards, supra note 256, at 64512–13
(implying that CCS technology implicates costs concerns).
290. See id. (detailing compliance costs).
291. See id. (projecting compliance costs for regulations of new or modified
fossil fuel fired power plants); Clean Power Plan Regulations, supra note 202,
at 64679 (projecting total compliance costs for the Clean Power Plan at $2.5
billion).
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implementation costs. 292 For example, the EPA enlarged emissions
limits for new fossil fuel burning power plants to address a
commenter’s concerns about implementation costs. 293 In the Clean
Power Plan ruling, the EPA highlights many times that its
partnership with states allows for flexibility in implementing
emissions goals. 294 Given Michigan v. EPA’s holding, the EPA may
have revised its regulations in an effort to accommodate the
Court’s current thinking on regulatory costs.
Additionally, Michigan v. EPA still leaves open questions
concerning so-called “co-benefits.” 295 These co-benefits in Michigan
v. EPA came from reductions in PM2.5 as opposed to directly from
HAP emissions, although science suggests a direct link between
HAPs and PM2.5. 296 The Court in Michigan v. EPA focused on the
relatively modest accounting of direct benefits compared to the
larger amount of co-benefits. 297 This characterization seems to
question whether a regulatory scheme is reasonable if its benefits
do not result directly enough from the scheme. 298 The Court’s
problem with co-benefits echoes many conservative criticisms
regarding air pollution standards. 299 The Clean Power Plan’s
benefits do not rest on co-benefits to the extent HAP regulations
did in Michigan v. EPA. 300 It does include some co-benefits and
world-wide benefits from GHG emissions reduction as opposed to
benefits arising exclusively from the U.S. 301 Michigan v. EPA’s
majority expressed hesitation at wading into the weeds too much
292. See New Source Greenhouse Gas Standards, supra note 256, at
64512–13 (noting that the EPA increased GHG emissions limits for new fossil
fuel power plants because of many commenters’ cost concerns); see also Clean
Power Plan Regulations, supra note 243, at 64665 (detailing cost concerns
built into the Clean Power Plan).
293. New Source Greenhouse Gas Standards, supra note 256, at 64512–13.
294. Clean Power Plan Regulations, supra note 242, at 64664–66.
295. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2705–06, 2711.
296. HAPs Regulations, supra note 216, at 9305; see also W. VA. DEP’T OF
ENVTL. PROT., HAZARDOUS AIR POLLUTANTS (HAPS ) LIST (2016),
www.dep.wv.gov/daq/Air%20Toxics/Pages/HazardousAirPollutants%28HAPs%
29List.aspx (listing many HAPs as VOCs as well); William M. Hodan &
William R. Barnard, Evaluating the Contribution of PM2.5 Precursor Gases
and Re-entrained Road Emissions to Mobile Source PM2.5 Particulate Matter
Emissions,
www3.epa.gov/ttnchie1/conference/ei13/mobile/hodan.pdf
(describing the effects of VOCs on HAPs ambient air pollution).
297. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2708.
298. Id.
299. See C Boyden Gray, EPA’s Use of Co-Benefits, THE FEDERALIST
SOCIETY (Sept. 24, 2015), www.fed-soc.org/publications/detail/epas-use-of-cobenefits (hypothesizing that the EPA may be double counting emissions
reductions across programs).
300. Compare Clean Power Plan Regulations, supra note 242, at 64679
(showing direct benefits of $2.8 billion) with HAPs Regulations, supra note
216, at 9305 (showing direct benefits of $4 to $6 million).
301. See Clean Power Plan Regulations, supra note 242, at 64679
(featuring co-benefits from global emissions reduction and reductions in other
pollutants from limiting GHGs).

2016]

At What Costs?

1289

in defining costs and benefits. 302 This may signal that the Court
will not give much traction to a direct challenge to the Clean
Power Plan on co-benefit grounds. Nevertheless, the co-benefits
question is another part of the Michigan v. EPA decision the Court
may consider in ruling on the Clean Power Plan.
No matter the legal outcome, the Clean Power Plan will
impact Michigan v. EPA’s precedential value. As the final rule
shows, the new regulations impose both expensive compliance
costs and have the potential for large societal benefits. 303 The
Court will likely revisit the reasoning of the Michigan v. EPA
decision when confronted with these challenges to the Clean
Power Plan. How much weight the Court gives the decision will
have a significant impact on the Clean Power Plan’s fate. If the
Court expands its Michigan v. EPA holding, the Clean Power Plan
may be in serious legal trouble. However, if the Court limits
Michigan v. EPA to its facts, this may signal that the Clean Power
Plan will survive its legal challenges.

IV. PROPOSAL: LITIGATION STRATEGIES IN DEFENDING
THE C LEAN POWER PLAN
With the many problems in the majority’s reasoning,
Michigan v. EPA seems to simply stand for the proposition that
regulations must be cost effective in order to be reasonable. 304
That idea may have merits as a policy of supporting efficient
government. 305 As a legal principle in interpreting the CAA, the
position seems fairly inappropriate. However, Michigan v. EPA is
binding precedent that will continue to affect environmental and

302. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2711.
303. See Clean Power Plan Regulations, supra note 242, at 64679 (listing
direct benefits at $2.8 billion in 2020 and total compliance costs at $2.5
billion).
304. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2709 (implying that regulatory
decisions are only reasonable when the benefits outweigh the costs).
305. See generally ALAN RANDALL, Benefit-Cost Considerations Should be
Decisive When There is Nothing More Important at Stake, in ECONOMICS,
ETHICS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY CONTESTED CHOICES, 53, 54–55 (Daniel
W. Bromly & Jouni Paavola eds., 2002) (discussing the normative goals that
cost-benefit analysis supports); see also Eric A. Posner, Controlling Agencies
with Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Positive Political Theory Perspective, 68 U. CHI .
L. REV . 1137, 1138–43 (positing that cost-benefit analysis can be a means for
political leaders to exercise oversight over agency decision making); Stephen
Clowney, Environmental Ethics and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 18 FORDHAM
ENVTL. L. REV . 105, 109 (advocating that cost-benefit analysis promotes
thoughtful deliberation and improves environmental group standing in public
discussions); Cass R. Sunstein, Cost Benefit Analysis and the Environment 4
(U. Chi. Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 227, Oct. 2004) (claiming that even
partial adoption of cost-benefit analysis could dramatically change
government agency regulation).
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administrative law for years to come. 306 The government and other
Clean Power Plan defenders must address Michigan v. EPA in
order to successfully vindicate the Clean Power Plan. How should
the Clean Power Plan defenders adjust their litigation strategy to
accommodate the Court’s Michigan v. EPA decision?
Michigan v. EPA should highlight for the Solicitor General,
the EPA lawyers, and others defending the Clean Power Plan the
Court’s focus on the major questions doctrine in CAA cases. While
Michigan v. EPA is not a case directly addressing GHG emissions,
it shows the Court is hesitant to grant the EPA broad powers
under the CAA to fight climate change. 307 If the Court shows
skepticism to the EPA regulations dealing with HAPs, Clean
Power Plan defenders can be sure that the Court views the Plan
with skepticism as well. 308 Clean Power Plan defenders should be
aware that they face serious challenges in showing that the Plan
does not violate the major questions doctrine. 309 From these
realizations, there are ways that defenders of the Clean Power
Plan can adjust their litigation strategy to downplay the Plan’s
impact on the energy market. This strategy can defeat a major
questions challenge, which is the most difficult obstacle the
defenders face in litigating the case.
Specifically, Clean Power Plan supporters should set three
goals for their litigation strategy in light of the Michigan v. EPA
decision. First, they must invest in the major questions challenge.
Second, the defenders must focus on existing energy market
conditions to show that the Clean Power Plan does not change
major trends in the industry. Third, the Court must understand
the meaning and scope of the Clean Power Plan’s benefits. While
these goals do not form a complete litigation strategy, they are
three areas where the Michigan v. EPA decision can most inform a
defense of the Clean Power Plan.

306. See Cass R. Sunstein, Thanks, Justice Scalia, for the Cost-Benefit
State, BLOOMBERG (July 7, 2015, 9:00 AM), www.bloombergview.com/
articles/2015-07-07/thanks-justice-scalia-for-the-cost-benefit-state
(praising
the Michigan decision for bringing more cost-benefit analysis to government
regulation); but cf. Andrew M. Grossmam, Michigan v. EPA: A Mandate for
Agencies to Consider Costs, 2014–2015 CATO SUP. CT. REV . 281, 302 (2015)
(questioning whether the Court will overturn many other government
regulations on the same grounds as they did in Michigan v. EPA).
307. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2708 (noting that Chevron
deference does not extend to statutory gerrymandering); see also Util. Air
Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2444 (striking down CAA Title V and PSD
permitting requirements that would apply to millions of small sources).
308. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2708 (express skepticism that
regulations that are not cost efficient can ever be reasonable under Chevron).
309. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 160 (outlining
the major questions doctrine).
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A. Invest in the Major Questions Doctrine
Constitutional arguments against the Clean Power Plan are
likely to fail. 310 Clean Power Plan challengers initially raised the
Fifth Amendment takings clause and the anti-commandeering
principles as reasons for rejecting the plan. 311 Generally, the Clean
Power Plan is not a regulatory taking because it would not render
coal or oil power plants completely useless to the plant owners. 312
Because the Clean Power Plan leaves open many productive uses
for coal and oil power plants, it meets the Penn Station factors
that govern regulatory takings. 313 The Clean Power Plan also does
not commandeer state legislative authority because the Plan
includes a federal option for non-participating states. 314 This
option is a legitimate exercise of federal power, and therefore does
not violate the anti-commandeering principle. 315 The major
questions doctrine, then, is likely to be the strongest challenge to
the Clean Power Plan.
While in Michigan v. EPA the government had the advantage
of addressing a narrow question, this may not be the case for the
Clean Power Plan defenders. 316 The Court’s order in Michigan v.
EPA to grant certiorari addressed the narrow question of whether
it was reasonable for the EPA to disregard costs in initially
deciding to regulate coal and oil power plants under § 7412(n). 317
The initial documents from the Clean Power Plan challengers do
not give much hope for a narrow certiorari ruling as the

310. See EPA’s Proposed 111(d) Rule For Existing Power Plants: Legal and
Cost Issues Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Energy and Power of the
House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of
Richard L. Revesz, Lawrence King Professor of Law, New York University
School of Law) (criticizing constitutional challenges to the Clean Power Plan).
But cf. id. (statement of Laurence H. Tribe, Carl M. Loeb Professor of
Constitutional Law, Harvard Law School) (outlining constitutional challenges
to the Clean Power Plan). The statement that constitutional arguments
against the Clean Power Plan are likely to fail is the author’s opinion
supported by the subsequent analysis.
311. Petition for Review, supra note 245, at 2.
312. See New Source Greenhouse Gas Standards, supra note 256, at 64512
(noting that many coal and oil power companies plan to comply with the Clean
Power Plan).
313. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124–25
(1978) (highlighting that regulatory takings are almost always valid unless
the regulatory action renders property completely unproductive).
314. See Parenteau, supra note 254 (detailing federal plan option for
states).
315. See New York v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992) (recounting Congress’
power to create laws under many different parts of the constitution).
316. Writ of Certiorari, Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 702 (2014) (No. 14-26)
(limiting question for the Court to whether the EPA unreasonably refused to
consider costs in regulating HAPs from coal and oil power plants).
317. Id.
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challengers are raising both statutory and constitutional
arguments. 318
Some prior D.C. Circuit case law suggests that the Court
could narrow the issues in this case on appeal. 319 Other parties
raised the anti-commandeering argument to challenge parts of the
CAA, but the D.C. Circuit completely rejected the argument. 320
This suggests that it is possible that the Supreme Court would not
consider the anti-commandeering question since this argument
does not have enough traction to move past the lower court. It
would ultimately be up to the Supreme Court, however, to define
the issues on appeal when deciding whether to grant certiorari.
There is no guarantee that the Court will narrow the issues on
appeal. Since Clean Power Plan defenders do not know the scope
of any challenge, they need to prioritize their efforts in defending
the Plan.
The major questions doctrine requires Clean Power Plan
challengers to develop a complex record. A baseline issue in any
major questions challenge is the current character of the industry
the government seeks to regulate. 321 Clean Power Plan defenders
then must develop a record to support their view of the energy
market as it currently exists. 322 Developing this record will require
that Clean Power Plan defenders introduce factual evidence
detailing the conditions of the energy industry in the United
States. 323 The defenders also must show that the Clean Power
Plan will have a minimum impact on the industry once
implemented. 324 Prioritizing issues and arguments is a
fundamental part of litigation. 325 In this case, it is clear that the
major questions doctrine will be an important part of the Clean
318. See Petition for Review at 2, supra note 245, (raising both statutory
and constitutional challenges to the Clean Power Plan).
319. See Texas v. EPA, 726 F.3d 180, 196–97 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (rejecting a
challenge to a PSD program for vehicle GHG emissions because the EPA can
administer the program itself without violating the anti-commandeering
principle).
320. Id.
321. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 160 (holding that
the major questions doctrine challenges agency actions when those actions
transform a substantial part of the national economy).
322. See Jonas Monast and David Hoppock, Designing CO 2 Performance
Standards for a Transitioning Electricity Sector, 44 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS &
ANALYSIS 11068, 11069–11072 (Dec. 2014) (characterizing the energy market
as increasing dependence on natural gas while decreasing dependence on
coal).
323. Id.
324. Id. at 11069–74 (showing market trends moving away from coal
electricity generation).
325. See generally Managing Litigation Checklist, PRACTICAL LAW (Feb. 15,
2015),
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/litigation/mate
rials/2015_corporate_counselcleseminar/Materials/1p_3_managing_litigation.a
uthcheckdam.pdf (describing issue assessment as an important part of prelitigation strategy).
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Power Plan litigation. 326 The Plan’s defenders then need to devote
substantial time to developing the factual record in order to
support their opposition to the major questions challenge.
Constitutional challenges to the Clean Power Plan are
contrary to prevailing Supreme Court precedent. 327 The major
questions challenge to the Clean Power Plan seems viable and
defending the Plan from the challenge will require a detailed case
record. 328 Therefore, a fundamental part of the Clean Power Plan
defense litigation strategy should be to invest time in the major
questions challenge. This decision directs resources and energy
toward the most difficult challenge the Clean Power Plan must
overcome to win the Court’s approval. 329

B. Focus on Existing Energy Market Conditions
Once Clean Power Plan defenders develop the record to give
an accurate view of the energy industry, they must minimize the
Plan’s impact on industry. Specifically, the defenders need to make
convincing arguments that the Clean Power Plan is not an attack
on the coal industry. The general trend in the energy market is
toward greater dependence on natural gas. 330 Advancements in
extracting shale gas in the United States made natural gas the
cheapest form of energy, regardless of the Clean Power Plan. 331
This is an important point that the Court must understand.
Coal companies are likely to highlight compliance costs and
market factors in challenging the Clean Power Plan. 332 Indeed,
326. Parenteau, supra note 260 (predicting that the Clean Power Plan will
survive but analyzing the major questions issue as a difficult challenge to the
Plan); but c.f. Oostdyk, supra note 272 (questioning whether Clean Power Plan
beyond-the-fenceline regulations can survive a major questions challenge).
327. See New York v. U.S., 505 U.S. at 160 (holding that federal actions do
not violate the anti-commandeering principle if the federal government
administers the regulatory program); see also Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S.
at 124–25 (showing that regulatory actions are not takings if there remains
some productive use for the regulated property); see also Texas, 726 F.3d at
196–97 (rejecting anti-commandeering argument in a CAA case).
328. See Oostdyk, supra note 272 (supporting major questions challenge to
the Clean Power Plan); see also Monast and Hoppock, supra note 322, at
11068–72 (detailing prevailing trends in the energy market).
329. See Oostdyk, supra note 272 (predicting failure of the Clean Power
Plan on major questions grounds).
330. See Monast and Hoppock, supra note 322, at 11068–70 (reporting on
the decline in power production from coal and increase in power production
from natural gas).
331. Id.
332. See Missouri River Energy Services, Environmental Protection Agency
Clean Power Plan Threatens MRES Resources, Consumers and Reliability
(Mar., 2015), www.mrenergy.com/uploads/files/2015_EPA_Clean_Power_Plan
_Fact_Sheet.doc (reporting that the Clean Power Plan may wipe out the power
company); see also Mario Parker, Obama’s Clean Power Plan Seen Wiping Out
(Oct.
27,
2015,
11:28
PM),
High-Cost
Coal,
BLOOMBERG
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coal power plants are closing around the country, and coal fired
electricity is losing market share. 333 The fact that the electricity
market will likely see little growth in demand in the near future
compounds these competitive pressures. 334 Coal companies,
somewhat validly, see environmental regulations as a burdensome
forced investment. 335 Many coal companies believe the regulations
force either substantial investment in equipment upgrades
without guarantees of high profits or shutting down altogether. 336
The onerous regulatory costs combine with low market growth to
create uncertainty in the coal companies’ long-term viability. 337
Michigan v. EPA shows that the Court has sympathy towards
coal industry compliance costs. 338 The Court’s holding in the case
mandates that the EPA consider compliance costs for regulated
industries. 339 This mandate does not have a foundation in CAA
case law and goes against the prevailing trend in CAA cases. 340 It
would also provide extra protection to coal companies against
future costly regulations. 341 Michigan v. EPA’s oral arguments
shows that at least one of the conservative justices — Justice Alito
— was sympathetic to industry costs. 342 Justice Alito seemed to
believe that § 7412(n)’s legislative history implied that Congress
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-08-03/obama-s-clean-power-plans-will
-kill-high-cost-coal-producers (detailing the Clean Power Plan’s effect on the
high cost coal industry).
333. See Monast and Hoppock, supra note 322, at 11068-69 (addressing
coal plant closures around the country but projecting that closures will decline
in the future).
334. Id. at 11072.
335. See id. at 11077 (describing how end use efficiency can prevent
burdensome investments in emissions control technologies).
336. See Missouri River Energy Services, supra note 332 (warning of
stranded investments in coal power plants); see also Monast and Hoppock,
supra note 322, at 11072 (predicting future coal plant closures).
337. See Missouri River Energy Services, supra note 332 (claiming the
Clean Power Plan could lead to “death by a thousand cuts” for power
companies with coal generators); see also Monast and Hoppock, supra note
322, at 11072 (detailing the competitive pressures from regulatory costs on the
coal industry).
338. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2707 (claiming that no regulation
is appropriate if compliance costs outweigh health benefits).
339. Id. at 2708.
340. See Whitman, 531 U.S. at 468 (holding that challengers must show a
statutory command for the EPA to consider costs in order to defeat regulations
where the EPA did not consider costs); see also Union Elec. Co., 427 U.S. at
256 (rejecting a claim that the EPA must consider economic feasibility in
approving a SIP).
341. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2707 (finding that regulations are
invalid if compliance costs outweigh benefits). If the Court’s holding in
Michigan v. EPA is a legal principle, then it would protect industry from noncost efficient regulations. Id.
342. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 46–47, Michigan v. EPA, 135 S.
Ct. 2699 (2015) (No. 14-46) (Justice Alito claiming that Congress treated
power plants separate in § 7412(n) to accommodate for their compliance costs).
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intended to separate coal and oil power plants from the other HAP
sources. 343 Chief Justice Roberts also characterized the disparity
between direct benefits and compliance costs as a “red flag” during
oral arguments. 344 He implied that in some situations cost
considerations can defeat regulatory action regardless of the
statutory language at issue. 345 Taken together, these remarks
show that the Court’s conservative justices are hesitant to impose
large costs on the coal industry without clear statutory
authority. 346
In this environment of solicitous attention toward compliance
costs, Clean Power Plan defenders need to minimize the impact of
the Plan on coal companies. They also need to maximize the
impact of general market trends on the coal industry. For
example, natural gas generation is the least costly form of new
electricity generation when leveling costs. 347 This competitive
pressure on coal exists outside of the Clean Power Plan. 348 New
coal generation was unlikely in the future without the Clean
Power Plan for simple economic reasons. 349 Additionally, futures
markets project low price increases for raw natural gas. 350 Even if
natural gas prices were to rise, they would have to almost double
in price to make new coal generation competitive with natural
gas. 351 These forces exist outside of the Clean Power Plan. 352
Essentially, fracking is destroying the coal industry, not the Clean
Power Plan or the EPA. 353 The Court must understand this for the
Clean Power Plan to prevail.

343. Id.
344. See id. at 62–64 (Chief Justice Roberts suggesting that the
disproportionate relationship between direct and co-benefits raises legitimacy
issues in HAP regulations).
345. Id. Chief Justice Roberts also connects this point with a suggestion
that the EPA may have used HAP regulations in order to impose stricter
requirements for PM2.5 then the Agency could otherwise. Id. at 64.
346. Id. at 46–47, 62–64.
347. See Monast and Hoppock, supra note 322, at 11071 (showing total
system levelized costs for natural gas generation at $67.1 per Megawatt Hour
(MWh) while coal generation stands at $100.1 MWh).
348. Id. The figures come from the U.S. Energy Information
Administration’s 2013 Annual Energy Outlook Report. Id.; U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY O UTLOOK 2013 WITH PROJECTIONS TO 2040 (Apr.,
2013), www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/p df/0383%282013%29.pdf.
349. See Monast and Hoppock, supra note 322, at 11070 (explaining that
increase in cheap natural gas limits future demand for coal).
350. See id. at 11071 (projecting level natural gas prices despite the
possibility for price shocks in regional areas).
351. See id. (noting that natural gas prices would have to almost double for
natural gas to achieve a levelized cost of new generation per MWh with coal).
352. Id.
353. See id. (attributing the drop in natural gas prices to shale extraction);
see also New Source Greenhouse Gas Standards, supra note 256, at 64512
(detailing decreased demand for coal production in electricity sector).
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There are also ways that the Clean Power Plan may help the
coal industry. Investing in energy efficiency is one strategy states
can choose to comply with the Clean Power Plan. 354 While
increased energy efficiency lowers overall demand for electricity, it
also lowers demand for new electricity generation. 355 This reduces
reliance on natural gas and allows power companies to invest
capital in their existing power generation fleet which includes coal
power plants. 356 Stabilizing electricity demand also incentivizes
state utilities to maintain their current mix of power generation
systems. 357 This mix includes coal power generation. 358
Energy efficiency investments are then in coal companies’
interests because they stabilize the energy market overall. 359 Some
states are exploring energy efficiency as a compliance strategy for
the Clean Power Plan. 360 Making this point clear to the Court is
important because it refutes a threshold question in a major
questions challenge. 361 If a government action parallels an already
existing change in an industry, that action cannot be subject to a
major questions challenge. 362 A threshold issue in the major
questions challenge is that the government action causes a major
change in a given industry. 363 If there is no government action
catalyzing a change in industry, logically there is no major
questions challenge. 364

C. Define Co-Benefits
Additionally, Clean Power Plan defenders must address the
co-benefits issue raised in Michigan v. EPA. 365 Michigan v. EPA’s

354. See Clean Power Plan Regulations, supra note 242, at 64665
(including energy efficiency programs as a compliance strategy for the Clean
Power Plan).
355. Monast and Hoppock, supra note 322, at 11077.
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 274 (listing coal as
accounting for 39% of total energy generation in the U.S. in 2013).
359. See Monast and Hoppock, supra note 322, at 11077 (noting the
benefits of energy efficiency actors within the energy market).
360. See Rebecca Stanfield, Illinois’s Climate plan can also be its plan for
economic growth, SWITCHBOARD NAT. RESOURCE DEF. COUNCIL STAFF BLOG
(Sept.
22,
2014),
http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/rstanfield
/illinoiss_climate_solutions_ca.html (advocating that Illinois use mostly energy
efficiency strategies to comply with the Clean Power Plan).
361. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 160 (defining
major questions challenge as when an agency’s action dramatically changes a
regulated industry).
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2711 (addressing the co-benefits
question).
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holding shows the importance of the co-benefits issue. 366 If
regulations must be cost efficient in order to be reasonable, what
qualifies as a benefit is a salient issue. 367 Each side in litigation
will debate the regulation’s benefits under this principle to see if
the regulation is in fact efficient. This is reason enough for Clean
Power Plan defenders to devote resource in their litigation
strategy to defining and explaining benefits and co-benefits to the
Court. The oral arguments from Michigan v. EPA also reveal a
mistake in the government’s responses to co-benefits questions
that the Clean Power Plan litigants should avoid repeating. 368
In particular, Justice Roberts asked the Solicitor General to
explain why there were a disparate proportion of direct benefits
from mercury regulation to co-benefits. 369 The Solicitor General
responded that the EPA did in fact list the other direct benefits
from the regulations. 370 Those benefits, however, were too difficult
to quantify, so the EPA did not attempt to quantify the benefits. 371
This answer did not address the Chief Justice’s fundamental
concern, and may have fueled the majority’s skepticism of the HAP
regulations. 372 If these listed benefits are difficult to quantify, then
it seems more likely that the benefits do not exist making the
regulation appear less reasonable. This was both a logical fallacy,
since the quantifiable nature of benefits does not determine
whether the benefits exist, and ignores the connection between
HAPs and PM2.5. 373 The Solicitor General missed an opportunity to
show that the direct benefits of HAP regulations are actually more
substantial than the $4-6 million figure cited in the majority’s
opinion. This point may have rendered the Michigan v. EPA
Court’s opinion moot. If in fact HAP regulations were cost
effective, there would be no point in the Court’s decision. 374
The Clean Power Plan’s cost-benefit analysis includes many
other potential pitfalls like the one the Solicitor General
encountered above. 375 First, the direct climate benefits in the
analysis are “global” climate benefits. 376 This means that it
366. Id.
367. See id. at 2707 (showing skepticism to regulations that do not pass a
cost-benefit analysis).
368. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 342, at 64 (featuring
Solicitor General’s response to a question about co-benefits).
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. Id.
372. Id.; see also Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2707 (expressing
skepticism that regulations with small direct benefits could be reasonable).
373. See Hodan and Bernard, supra note 296 (explaining the connection
between HAPs and PM2.5).
374. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2707 (questioning whether
inefficient regulations are appropriate).
375. See Clean Power Plan Regulations, supra note 242, at 64679–82
(outlining costs and benefits of the Clean Power Plan).
376. Id. at 64681.
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accounts for climate benefits in other countries, which the Court
may find suspicious. 377 However, there are certainly benefits in
mitigating climate change that would affect the United States, and
the government should take care to explain these benefits to the
Court. 378 Second, the Clean Power Plan cost-benefit analysis
includes co-benefits from reduction in PM2.5 and ozone
emissions. 379 The government needs to defend these benefits. This
includes explaining why PM2.5 is not more properly addressed in
other CAA statutes and explaining that PM2.5 reduction produces
health benefits no matter the source. 380 Third, Clean Power Plan
benefits grow almost exponentially in the analysis. 381 For example,
in one model climate benefits increase from $3.3 billion in 2020 to
$20 billion in 2030. 382 The government must advocate for a longer
view of cost-benefit analysis because with time the Clean Power
Plan benefits far outweigh the costs. 383
This comprehensive view of Clean Power Plan benefits will
help defenders analogize the case with the Massachusetts v. EPA
decision. In Massachusetts v. EPA, the state appellants were able
to impress upon the Court the severity of refusing to address
climate change. 384 The opinion notes rising sea levels and other
adverse weather effects as specific harms facing states without
federal intervention under the CAA. 385 However, Utility Air
Regulatory Group and Michigan v. EPA emphasize the burden
CAA regulations could have on market actors. 386 By explaining
Clean Power Plan benefits thoroughly, its defenders can introduce
377. Id.
378. See id. at 64679–82 (detailing climate and health benefits); see also
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FACT SHEET: CLEAN POWER PLAN BENEFITS
(2014),
www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-05/documents/20140602fsbenefits.pdf (asserting that the Clean Power Plan could prevent up to 6,400
premature deaths and 150,000 asthma attacks in children).
379. See Clean Power Plan Regulations, supra note 242, at 64680 (listing
benefits from PM2.5 and ozone reduction).
380. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 342, at 63 (Chief Justice
Roberts questioning why the EPA can claim benefits from PM2.5 when PM2.5 is
regulated under other CAA provisions); see also World Health Organization,
Health Effects of Particulate Matter 6 (2013), www.euro.who.int/__data/assets
/pdf_file/006/189051/Health-effects-of-particulate-matter-final-Eng.pdf
(explaining the effect PM2.5 has on people with pre-existing heart conditions
and the elderly).
381. See Clean Power Plan Regulations, supra note 242, at 64679–82
(showing large increases in Clean Power Plan benefits over time).
382. Id. at 64681.
383. Id.
384. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 521 (describing the risks of
rising sea levels and water scarcity from climate change).
385. Id.
386. See Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. 2444 (nothing that the EPA’s
actions would extend its regulatory authority to many small businesses); see
also Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2708 (implying that regulatory actions that
do not consider costs are unreasonable).
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the same scenarios where the US does nothing about climate
change that motivated the Massachusetts v. EPA court. Without
the Clean Power Plan, it will be difficult for the US to meet its
climate change goals under the 2015 Paris Agreements and
thereby maintain the international credibility of the Paris
Agreements. 387 The same disasters that motivated the Court to
find carbon an air pollutant under the CAA in Massachusetts v.
EPA are possible without the Clean Power Plan. 388 This shift in
focus may persuade a majority of the Court to return to the
concerns about GHG emissions that motivated the Massachusetts
v. EPA decision.

V. CONCLUSION
The Michigan v. EPA decision presents many challenges and
opportunities. With its misapprehension of case law and statutory
context, the Court’s reasoning in the decision is suspect. 389 The
Court also employed a novel application of the Chenery doctrine to
limit the scope of its judicial review. 390 This application distorts
the benefits of the Chenery doctrine in the non-delegation
framework. 391 Finally, Michigan v. EPA could have a substantial
impact on the fate of the Clean Power Plan. 392 Clean Power Plan

387. See Eric Anthony DeBellis, In Defense of the Clean Power Plan: Why
Greenhouse Gas Regulations Under Clean Air Act Section 111(D) Need Not,
and Should Not, Stop at the Fenceline, 42 ECOLOGY L.Q. 235, 260 (2015)
(explaining that striking down the Clean Power Plan would prevent the US
from meeting the 2015 Paris Agreement); Ben Adler, Will One of These Clowns
Destroy the Paris Climate Deal?, MOTHER JONES (Dec. 18, 2015, 6:00 AM),
www.motherjones.com/environment/2015/12/republicans-paris-climate-change
-deal-cop21 (predicting that any domestic reversal of the Clean Power Plan
could kill the Paris Agreement). But cf. Fiona Harvey and Suzanne
Goldenberg, US Clean Power Plan Setback ‘Will Not Affect Paris Climate
G UARDIAN
(Feb.
10,
2016
12:27
PM),
Change
Deal,
THE
www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/feb/10/us-clean-power-plan-setbackwill-not-affect-paris-climate-change-deal (reporting that European nations and
the United States remained faithful to the Paris Agreement despite Supreme
Court stay of the Clean Power Plan). The Paris Agreement depends on nations
setting voluntary emissions reductions goals, and US leadership in reductions
is critical to maintain the Agreement’s international credibility. Jorge E.
Vinuales, The Paris Climate Agreement: An Initial Examination 5 (Cambridge
Ctr. for Env’t, Energy, and Nat. Res., Working Paper No. 6, December 15,
2015).
388. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 521.
389. See discussion supra Part III. A (explaining problems with the
Michigan v. EPA decision).
390. See discussion supra Part III. B (criticizing the Court’s application of
the Chenery doctrine in Michigan v. EPA).
391. Id.
392. See discussion supra Part III. C (predicting the effect of the Michigan
v. EPA decision on the Clean Power Plan).
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challengers could use the decision alongside other statutory
attacks on the EPA’s plan to reduce GHG emissions. 393
In anticipation of future Clean Power Plan litigation, the
Michigan v. EPA decision reveals three goals Clean Power Plan
defenders should set for themselves. 394 First, the defenders must
invest in the major questions doctrine. 395 Second, Clean Power
Plan defenders need to focus on existing energy market
conditions. 396 Third, the defenders need to define the Plan’s cost
and benefits. 397 While these goals do not form a comprehensive
litigation strategy, they are important lessons that Clean Power
Plan defenders need to take from the Michigan v. EPA case. 398
These goals will help defend the Clean Power Plan from a major
questions challenge. 399
While Michigan v. EPA does not address GHG emissions, the
case fits well within a family of cases defining the scope of the
CAA and GHG regulations. 400 These cases sometimes give
deference to the EPA in regulating GHG emissions, while other
times limit the Agency’s authority. 401 If Clean Power Plan
defenders can see the flaws in the Michigan v. EPA decision and
understand the case’s implication for their litigation strategy, they
are more likely to succeed in their task. 402 Ignoring the case will
increase the likelihood that the Clean Power Plan will fail.
Michigan v. EPA represents a unique data point in the Court’s
thinking concerning the scope of the CAA. 403 Hopefully,
environmental advocates will adjust to the Court’s decision and
use it to further their efforts to tailor CAA provisions to fight
climate change.
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under the CAA definition of air pollutant); see also Util. Air Regulatory Grp.,
134 S. Ct. at 2444–50 (denying the EPA authority to regulate GHG emissions
under Title V and PSD programs generally but allowing the EPA to regulate
GHG emissions from sources already coved under Title V and the PSD
program); see also EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. at 1606–07
(allowing the EPA to consider costs in implementing the CAA’s Good Neighbor
Provision).
401. Compare Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 532 (holding that GHGs
are an air pollutant under the CAA), with Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct.
at 2444 (limiting the EPA’s authority to regulate GHG emissions under Title V
and the PSD program).
402. See discussion supra Part IV.
403. See discussion supra Part III. A.

